Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: Adducing Congressional Intent by Graf, Richard M
Boston College Law Review
Volume 24
Issue 5 Number 5 Article 2
9-1-1983
Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: Adducing
Congressional Intent
Richard M. Graf
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Education Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard M. Graf, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: Adducing Congressional Intent, 24 B.C.L. Rev.
1243 (1983), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol24/iss5/2
NOTES
TITLE IX AND INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS:
ADDUCING CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
"He applies his words to all uses, except to the indication of his mind."
— Jonathan Swift, Gulliver's Travels.
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972' prohibits, with a few
limited exceptions, sex discrimination in any education program or activity
receiving federal financial assistance. 2 In 1975, the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, pursuant to its statutory authority, 3 issued regula-
tions concerning specific education programs, including intercollegiate athlet-
ics. These regulations,' which became effective in July, 1975, were designed to
' Education Amendments of 1972 55 901-907, 20 U.S.C. 55 1681-1686 (1976).
Section 901, the substantive section of Title IX, provides, in relevant part: "No per-
son in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiv-
ing Federal financial assistance, except „ . " Education Amendments of 1972 5 901(a), 20
U.S.C. 5 1681(a) (1976). Nine statutory exemptions to S 901(a)'s coverage follow. Among the
specific exemptions included are ones for religious schools, military schools, social fraternities,
father-son and mother-daughter activities, and beauty pageant scholarships. See id. at 55
901(a)(1)-(9).
' Education Amendments of 1972 902, 20 U.S.C. 5 1682 (1976). Section 902 pro-
vides in relevant part:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal
financial assistance to any education program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or
contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed
to effectuate the provisions of section 1681 with respect to such program or activity
by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be
consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial
assistance in connection with which the action is taken. No such rule, regulation, or
order shall become effective unless and until approved by the President. Compli-
ance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be affected (1) by
the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program
or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the
record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement,
but such termination or refusal shall be limited to the particular political entity, or
part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding has been made, and shall
be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which such non-
compliance has been so found, or (2) by any other means authorized by law: Pro-
vided, however, That no such action shall be taken until the department or agency
concerned has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply
with the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured by
voluntary means... .
Id. (Emphasis in the original.)
* 34 C.F.R. 5 106 (1982). The regulations initially appeared at 34 C.F.R.5 86 (1975),
but were recodified in connection with the establishment of the Department of Education. HEW's
functions under Title IX were transferred in 1979 to the newly created Department of Education
by 301(a)(3) of the Department of Education Organization Act, 20 U.S.C. 5 3441(a)(3) (Supp.
V 1981). Because the majority of the regulations were originally issued by HEW, but were en-
forced in most of the cases considered by both HEW and the Department of Education, herein-
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implement the statute's broad prohibition against sex discrimination. In the
past few years several cases' and commentaries' have focused on what should
be the proper scope of these regulations. Particularly at issue has been whether
or not the term "federal financial assistance" of section 901, the substantive
section of Title IX, encompasses indirect federal aid and, if so, what constitutes
the "program or activity" funded for the purposes of regulation and fund ter-
mination under section 902, the enforcement section of Title IX.
The Department, interpreting its mandate broadly, has construed the
phrase "federal financial assistance" to include funds received indirectly by a
school, including grants and loans paid directly to students but which ultimate-
ly are received by the school.' Thus, the Department has asserted that it has
the authority under section 902 not only to investigate all of a school's pro-
grams, but also to terminate funds if a program is found to be in non-
compliance with its regulations, even if the school enrolls only one student who
receives federal aid.' The Department's position has been challenged most
recently in two cases involving alleged sex discrimination in intercollegiate
athletic programs.' In both cases, the universities charged with the discrimina-
tion moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the Department had
exceeded its authorization from Congress in promulgating such sweeping
regulations. 1 °
after the generic term "Department" will be used to refer to both agencies unless greater
specificity is warranted.
3
 See, e.g., Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418 (6th Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed,
51 U.S.L.W. 3704 (U.S. March 16, 1983) (No. 82-1538); Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Schweik-
er, 652 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated, 102 S. Ct. 3475 (1982), aff'd on rehearing sub nom. Iron
Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Heckler, 702 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1983), petition for cert. filed, 52 U.S.L.W.
3028 (U.S. Aug. 8, 1983) (No. 83-118); Rice v. Presidents and Fellows of Harvard College, 663
F.2d 336 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1982); Wort v. Vierling, No. 82-3169 (C.D.
Ill. May 28, 1982); Bennett v. West Texas State Univ., 525 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd,
698 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1983), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3775 (U.S. Apr, 6, 1983) (No.
82-1683); Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Stipp. 1376 (E.D. Mich. 1981), aff'd, 699 F.2d
309 (6th Cir. 1983).
6 See, e.g., Cox, Intercollegiate Athletics and Title IX, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 34 (1977);
Kuhn, Title IX: Employment and Athletics Are Outside IIEW's Jurisdiction, 65 GEo. L.J. 49 (1976);
Comment, HEW's Regulation Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972: Ultra Vires
Challenge, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV. 133 [hereinafter cited as Comment, Ultra Vires Challenge]; Com-
ment, Half-Court Girls Basketball Rules: An Application of the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX, 65
IowA L. REV. 766 (1980); Note, Title VI, Title IX, and the Private University: Defining "Recipient"
and "Program or Part Therenf," 78 MICH. L. REV. 608 (1980).
7
 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(g)(1)(ii) (1982). The regulation defines federal financial assist-
ance, in relevant part, as: "(1) A grant or loan of Federal financial assistance, including funds
made available for: ... (ii) Scholarships, loans, grants, wages or other funds extended to any en-
tity for payment to or on behalf of students admitted to that entity, or extended directly to such
students for payment to that entity." Id.
See University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321, 324-25 (E.D. Va. 1982). For a
thorough explication of the review and termination process see Note, Title IX and Intercollegiate
Athletics: HEW Gets Serious About Equality in Sports?, 15 NEW ENG. L. REV. 573, 575-76 (1980).
9
 University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321(E.D. Va. 1982); Haffer v. Tem-
ple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd per curiam, 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982).
1 ° Richmond, 543 F. Supp. at 325; Huffer, 524 F. Supp. at 532.
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In University of Richmond v. Bell," the district court for the Eastern District
of Virginia granted the University's motion for summary judgment, ruling
that the Department had ascribed an overbroad scope to Title IX in the regula-
tions, contrary to Congressional intent. 12
 The issue, according to the court,
was whether the program in question received direct federal financial
assistance." The court held that because the university had received no federal
funds specifically earmarked for its athletic programs, the Department could
not legally investigate the alleged discrimination in the athletic department."
In Haffer v. Temple University," however, the district court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, in an opinion that was summarily affirmed by the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit," denied defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment, ruling that Congress had intended that indirectly aided or bene-
fited programs be covered under Title IX." Because Temple obtained approxi-
mately one-tenth of its annual operating budget from various federal sources, 18
the court determined that its athletic department had indirectly benefited from
this federal aid. 19
 According to the court, this funding allowed the University to
release resources to the athletic department that would have otherwise gone to
higher priority programs," The court ruled, alternatively, that Temple's
athletic department had received direct federal assistance, within the meaning
of section 901, because some student-athletes received Basic Educational Op-
portunity Grants (BEOG's) while other students, who worked for the athletic
department, had part of their wages paid through federal work-study grants. 2 '
This note evaluates the reasoning and conclusions of the Richmond and
Haffer courts in light of the guidelines established by the Supreme Court for
" 543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982).
' 2 Id. at 327.
13 Id. at 327 n.10.
' 4 Id. at 332-33.
15
 524 F. Stipp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
" Hailer v. Temple Univ., 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982).
" 524 F. Supp. at 536.
'u id. at 532. In 1980-81 this aid included over $10 million in financial aid awarded to
Temple students, and almost $20 million in direct federal grants and contracts. Brief for
Plaintiffs-Appellees at 1-2, Haffer v. Temple Univ., 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982). Aid received in
prior years still benefiting the university in 1980-81 included over $7 million in grants for the con-
struction and renovation of classrooms and low interest loans to finance the construction of dor-
mitories. Id. at 2.
Haffer, 524 F. Supp. at 538.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 540. In addition to the BEOG program, 20 U.S.C. 5 1070a (1976), and the
College Work Study Program, 42 U.S.C. 2751 (1976), the court cited as other sources of direct
federal assistance the Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grant (SEOG) Program, 20
U.S.C. 55 1070b-1070b-3 (1976), the National Direct Student Loan (NDSL) Program, 20
U.S.C. 1087aa-1087ff (1976), and the Guaranteed Student Loan (GSL) Program, 20 U.S.C.
55 1071-1087-4 (1976). The last two programs have been held to be outside the coverage of Title
IX as contracts of insurance under a section 902 exemption. Grove City College v. Bell, 500 F.
Supp. 253, 268-69 (W.D. Pa. 1980) rev'd on other grounds, 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982). This
ruling was not contested by the Department on appeal, so the circuit court did not rule on the
issue. 687 F.2d at 690 n.10.
1246	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 24:1243
Title IX analysis in a recent case, North Haven Board of Education v. Bell. 22 Sec-
tion I provides a brief historical background of Title IX and the regulations
which were issued to implement the Title. Section II examines the two lower
court decisions to determine the bases for their differing results. In section III,
the note examines the North Haven decision and extracts from it the guidelines
to be followed in Title IX statutory interpretation. Section IV, applying the
guidelines extracted from North Haven, studies the available legislative and
post-enactment history for evidence of Congress' intent in passing Title IX,
especially as regards the coverage of intercollegiate athletics. It is submitted
that the legislative history of Title IX demonstrates that Congress intended
athletic programs receiving indirect federal funding to be subject to the stric-
tures of Title IX. Finally, this note concludes that the result reached by the
Hoffer court is the one most consonant with Congressional intent."
I. HISTORY OF TITLE IX
A. Congressional Action and Enactment
Title IX grew out of hearings held in 1970, by a special House subcom-
mittee, on sex discrimination in education. 24 Although the proposal on which
the hearings were convened never emerged from the committee, 25
 the hearings
did provide Congress with evidence of a clear pattern of discrimination against
women in higher education. 26 In response to this evidence, Senator Bayh in-
troduced an amendment in August 1971 to the Senate's aid to higher education
bill" that contained many of the essential provisions of Title IX. 25
Senator Bayh's amendment was defeated when the Senate sustained a rul-
ing by the Chair that the amendment was not germane to the bill being con-
22
 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
23 See infra notes 248-254 and accompanying text.
2+
 See Discrimination Against Women.- Hearings on Section 805 of H.R. 16098 Before the Special
Subcommittee on Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
" 5 805, H.R. 16098, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). The section would have modified
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 5 601, 42 U.S.C. 5 2000d (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) by
adding the word "sex" to section 601; would have extended the protections of Title VII, 42
U.S.C. 12000e (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), to employees of educational institutions; and would
have given the Civil Rights Commission jurisdiction over gender discrimination claims. North
Haven, 456 U.S. at 523 n.13. Section 805 was deleted from the bill because its sponsors were fear-
ful of attempts to restrict the coverage and enforcement of Title VI if it was opened for amend-
ment. Id. at 546-47 (Powell, J., dissenting).
26 See North Haven, 456 U.S. at 523 n.13; Comment, Ultra Vires Challenge, supra note 6, at
140.42.
" S. 659, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REC. 30,155-58 (1971).
" The amendment stated, in pertinent part:
No person in the United States shall, on the grounds of sex ... be subject to discrimination
under any program or activity conducted by a public institution of higher education, or any
school or department of graduate education, which is a recipient of Federal financial assistance
for any education program or activity ....
Id. at 30,156. For a more detailed explication of the bill see Comment, Ultra Vires Challenge, supra
note 6, at 143-44.
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sidered. 29 In February 1972, however, Senator Bayh introduced a somewhat
modified version of his original provision as a floor amendment during debate
on the Education Amendments of 1972. 30 The amendment was adopted that
day on a voice vote." The amendment was virtually indentical to a house bill,
H.R. 7248, 32
 which had been introduced the previous year. Congress subse-
quently resolved several differences in conference, and on June 8, 1972
adopted the conference version as Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972."
B. The Title IX Regulations
Following Title IX's enactment, HEW began work on the regulations as
authorized by section 902." In June 1974, two years after enactment of the bill,
the Department published its proposed Title IX regulations. 35 An immediate
public outcry ensued. During the comment period the 'Department found itself
deluged by almost 10,000 comments on the proposed regulations. 36 Though
only two sections of the proposed regulations pertained to intercollegiate
athletic programs, 32
 an overwhelming majority of the comments contained ob-
jections to these two sections." One section of the proposed regulations con-
tained a general prohibition against sex discrimination in athletic programs,
but permitted separate teams to be operated according to sex when the selec-
25
 117 CONG. REC. 30,415 (1971). Had the bill gone to a vote on the merits, it appears
it would have passed. Id. at 30,414 (remarks of Senator Allen). Senator Bayh made a crucial
parliamentary error, however, when he failed to object to a unanimous-consent request on the
germaneness issue. Id. at 30,515 (remarks of Presiding Officer). Had he objected, he would have
prevented the germaneness rule from applying and the amendment would have remained ap-
propriate on the pending bill. Id. Thus, for want of an objection, the nation's entire course of
discrimination prohibition may well have been changed, for the amendment under consideration
was considerably broader in its prohibition than is Title IX, in that it prevented all sex
discrimination in every part of any school which accepted any amount of federal aid.
'° Amendment 874 of the Education Amendments of 1972, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 118
CONG. REC. 5802-03 (1972).
31 118 CONG. REC. 5815 (1972).
32
 H.R. 7248, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REC. 39,248 (1971).
" The conference action is reported in S. REP. NO. 798, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 221-22,
reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2608, 2671-72. For the text of the statute see
supra notes 2-3 and infra note 60.
34 See supra note 3.
35
 39 Fed. Reg. 22,228-40 (1974).
36 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975). See Cox, supra note 6, at 40; Comment, Ultra Vires
Challenge, supra note 6, at 145-46.
" Proposed C.F.R. section 86.38 was the major substantive section applying to
athletics. Proposed C.F.R. section 86.35 dealt with athletic scholarships.
35 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975). Then Secretary Weinberger was quoted as saying: "I
had not realized until the comment period that athletics is the single most important thing in the
United States." Cox, supra note 6, at 34 (quoting N.Y. Times, June 27, 1975, at 16, col. 4). See
also, Weinberger, Reflections on the Seventies, 8 J. COLL. & U.L. 451, 458-59 (1981) ("probably the
single most controversial application of the Title IX regulations respecting educational programs
was to intercollegiate athletics.").
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tion for the teams was based upon competitive skill." This section also re-
quired "affirmative efforts" by schools to provide women with equal athletic
opportunities and support, and to inform women of the opportunities available
to them at the schoo1. 4° It further required each institution to make an annual
survey of the sports in which participation was desired by members of both
sexes.'" In response to the objections, HEW withdrew the proposed regulations
in an effort to address some of the perceived problems, most notably, the an-
nual survey requirements and the lack of an exemption for separate teams in
contact sports. 42
A year later, in June 1975, HEW published its final, revised, Title IX
regulations." Although the regulations had been altered to some extent, their
basic thrust remained the same. Section 106.41 is the major substantive section
of the regulations applicable to intercollegiate athletics." It contains inter alia a
39 See Cox, supra note 6, at 40.
4° Id.
41 Id.
" Id. at 40-41.
" 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 86 (1975)).
* 4 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (1982). This section provides, in pertinent part:
(a) General. No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, be treated differently from another person or otherwise be
discriminated against in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural
athletics offered by a recipient, and no recipient shall provide any such athletics
separately on such basis.
(b) Separate teams. Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph (a) of this sec-
tion, a recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for members of each sex
where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity in-
volved is a contact sport. However, where a recipient operates or sponsors a team in
a particular sport for members of one sex but operates or sponsors no such team for
members of the other sex, and athletic opportunities for members of that sex have
previously been limited, members of the excluded sex must be allowed to tryout for
the team offered unless the sport involved is a contact sport. For the purposes of this
part, contact sports included boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basket-
ball and other sports the purpose or major activity of which involves bodily contact.
(c) Equal opportunity. A recipient which operates or sponsors interscholastic, inter-
collegiate, club or intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic opportunity for
members of both sexes. In determining whether equal opportunities are available
the Director will consider, among other factors:
(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively accom-
modate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes;
(2) The provision of equipment and supplies;
(3) Scheduling of games and practice time;
(4) Travel and per diem allowance;
(5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;
(6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities;
(8) Provision of medical and training facilities and services;
(9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services;
(10) Publicity.
Unequal aggregate expenditures for members of each sex or unequal expenditures
for male and female teams if a recipient operates or sponsors separate teams will not
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general provision prohibiting sex discrimination in any athletic program, in-
cluding club or intramural athletics, administered by a "recipient" 45 of federal
assistance; a provision governing the instances when separate-sex teams will be
allowed; and a requirement that "equal athletic opportunity" shall be pro-
vided members of both sexes. Section 106.37(c) provides rules for the awarding
of athletic scholarships," Following Presidential approval,'" the regulations
were lain before Congress for a period of 45 days, pursuant to section 431(d)(1)
of the General Education Provisions Act." This "laying before" provision was
designed to afford Congress an opportunity to examine regulations prior to
their becoming effective. If Congress found the regulations inconsistent with its
intent, it could disapprove them by concurrent resolution, rendering them
void. If no such resolution were adopted prior to the expiration of the 45 day
period, the regulations would automatically become effective." Despite the in-
troduction of several resolutions of disapproval in both Houses of Congress, 5 °
none were passed, and the Title IX regulations went into effect on July 21,
1975.
constitute noncompliance with this section, but the Assistant Secretary may con-
sider the failure to provide necessary funds for teams of one sex in assessing equality
of opportunity for members of each sex.
Id.
" For purposes of Title IX, a recipient is defined as:
Any State or political subdivision thereof, or any instrumentality of a State or
political subdivision thereof, any public or private agency, institution, or organiza-
tion, or other entity, or any person, to whom Federal financial assistance is ex-
tended directly or through another recipient and which operates an education pro-
gram or• activity which receives or benefits from such assistance, including any
subunit, successor, assignee, or transferee thereof.
34 C.F.R. 5 106.2(h) (1982)
" 34 C.F.R. 5 106.37(c) (1982). This regulation states:
(I) To the extent that a recipient awards athletic scholarships or grants-in-aid, it
must provide reasonable opportunities for such awards for members of each sex in
proportion to the number of students of each sex participating in interscholatic or
intercollegiate athletics.
(2) Separate athletic scholarships or grants-in-aid for members of each sex may be
provided as part of separate athletic teams for members of each sex to the extent
consistent with this paragraph and 5 106.41.
Id.
47 See infra notes 224-26 and accompanying text.
48
 General Education Provisions Act, as amended, 20 U S.C.	 1232(d)(1) (Supp. V
1981).
49
 See Hearings on S. 2106 Before the Senate Committee on Post Secondary Education of the Com-
mittee on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1975). Congress could have adopted a
resolution disapproving only specific parts of the regulation while allowing the rest to become ef-
fective, thereby excising only what it believed were the overbroad sections. Id. at 95-96 (remarks
of Sen. Buchannan); id. at 122 (remarks of Sen. Brown).
5° See S. Con. Res. 52, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 22,940 (1975); H.R.
Con. Res. 330, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 21,687 (1975); H.R. Con. Res. 329,
94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 21,687 (1975); H.R. Con. Res. 311, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 19,209 (1975); H.R. Con. Res. 310, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONC.
REC. 19,209 (1975); S. Con. Res. 46, 94th Cong., .1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 17,300 (1975). For
a discussion of these resolutions see infra notes 190-247 and accompanying text.
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II. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO TITLE IX REGULATIONS
In two recent court cases, the validity of these Title IX regulations has
come under attack in the context of alleged discrimination in intercollegiate
athletic programs. In both University of Richmond v. Bell and Haffer v. Temple
University the regulations were challenged as being beyond the scope of the
regulatory authority granted to the Department in Title IX. Although the
courts were faced with essentially identical issues, they reached decidedly dif-
ferent results.
A. University of Richmond v. Bell
The litigation in University of Richmond v. Bell arose when the University
filed suit in federal district court seeking to enjoin the Department from pro-
ceeding with an investigation of the University's athletic department. The De-
partment had begun its investigation in response to a complaint it had received
from students at the University alleging sex discrimination in the University's
athletic department. The University of Richmond is a private university con-
sisting of several separate schools and colleges, including two coordinate single-
sex undergraduate liberal arts colleges. The two schools are separate adminis-
tratively," though students at both colleges attend most of their classes to-
gether. The university athletic department oversees both intercollegiate and
club sports for all students within the university. Funding for the athletic de-
partment is drawn from sports revenue, gifts, and the general funds of the uni-
versity. The athletic department receives no direct federal financial assistance."
In February 1981, the Department notified the University that it had
received a complaint which alleged that there was sex discrimination in the
athletic department. 53
 The notification stated that the Department had con-
ducted a review of the allegations and, based upon the University's receipt of a
$1900 federal Library Resource Grant, the Department had determined that it
had authority to investigate the complaint. 54
 The University, through its
counsel, responded by requesting clarification and questioning the propriety of
the investigation. 55 The Department responded by informing the University
that it planned a week-long on-site review of the University's athletic program,
and requested that the University answer a lengthy informational question-
" Richmond, 543 F. Supp. at 322-23. The two schools maintain separate admissions of-
flees, hold separate graduations, and provide many auxiliary services separately. Id,
52 Id. at 323.
53 Id.
54 Id. The University had received grants of $1900 (1980-81) and $1200 (1981-82)
under the College Library Resources Program, 20 U.S.C. 1029 (Supp. V 1981). By statute,
the funds must be used exclusively to purchase library materials. 543 F. Supp. at 323 n.l.
35
 543 F. Supp. at 323.
September 1983]	 TITLE IX AND INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 	 1251
naire prior to the review. 56 The University refused the request and questioned
the Department's authority to investigate the athletic department. 57
In response, the Department asserted that the University's receipt of any
federal funds, directly or indirectly, required its compliance with Title IX. 58
Noting that the University had received, during the 1980-81 school year,
money from its students' BEOG's, National Direct Student Loans (NDSL's),
Supplementary Educational Opportunity Grants (SEOG's), work-study
grants, and Department of Education grants, as well the direct Library grant,
the Department maintained that the University was required to comply with
the provisions of Title IX in all its educational programs and activities, in-
cluding its athletic programs. The Department cautioned that failure to comply
with the information request would result in enforcement proceedings." The
University informed the Department of its continued refusal to comply with the
information request and filed suit pursuant to section 903 of Title IX 6° seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief. 6 ' The Department held the investigation in
abeyance, pending the outcome of the suit, 62
The University moved for summary judgment, arguing that Title IX is
"program specific" and consequently applies only to those "programs or ac-
56 Id. The request covered all aspects of the athletic program including its budgets,
practice schedules and transportation policies, as well as lists of teams, locker room, and training
facilities. Id. at 323 n.3.
" Id. at 323. The University also stated that the request was unduly lengthy and bur-
densome, possibly in excess of the Department's investigative authority, and was on a request
form which had not been previously submitted for approval to the Office of Management and
Budget as required in 42 U.S.C. § 3509 (1976). Id.
" Id. at 323-24 n.5. The letter which the Department sent to the University stated, in
relevant part: "Whether a particular education program or activity receives federal funds is not
determinative of coverage of that program or activity by title IX. Rather, the determination is
based on whether the "recipient" institution receives, either directly or indirectly, "Federal
financial assistance" which benefits its programs and activities." Id.
59 Id. at 324.
"" Id. at 333. Education Amendments of 1972 § 903, 20 	 5 1683 (1976) provides:
Any department or agency action taken pursuant to section 1682 of this title shall be
subject to such judicial review as may otherwise be provided by law for similar ac-
tion taken by such department or agency on other grounds. In the case of action, not
otherwise subject to judicial review, terminating or refusing to grant or to continue
financial assistance upon a finding of failure m comply with any requirement im-
posed pursuant to section 1682 of this title, any person aggrieved (including any
State or political subdivision thereof and any agency of either) may obtain judicial
review of such action in accordance with chapter 7 of title 5, and such action shall
not be deemed committed to unreviewable agency discretion within the meaning of
section 701 of the title.
Id.
6 ' 543 F. Supp. at 332-33. The University sought an injunction prohibiting the Depart-
ment from proceeding with the investigation of the University and from initiating the enforce-
ment proceedings. Id. at 333. It further sought a declaration that the regulations were invalid and
unauthorized by the statute. Id. at 332-33.
52 Id. at 324.
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tivities" that receive direct federal financial assistance." The regulations, ac-
cording to the University, were ultra vires64 and unlawful to the extent that they
attempted to regulate programs that did not receive direct federal assistance. 65
The Department, stressing that a court should defer to the implementing agen-
cy's statutory interpretation, 66 reasserted its position that the indirect receipt of
federal funds is sufficient to bring a university within the reach of Title IX.°
On this basis, the Department cross motioned for a summary judgment declar-
ing the regulations valid and the proposed investigation lawful."
In denying the University's request for declaratory relief, the district court
did not invalidate the regulations outright as courts had done in several
previous Title IX cases. 69 The Richmond court did, however, grant the Univer-
sity's motion for injunctive relief and enjoined the Department both from pro-
ceeding with the investigation of the University and from commencing enforce-
ment proceedings against the University because of the University's refusal to
comply with the information requests." Moreover, the court enjoined the De-
partment from investigating any school within its jurisdiction, absent a show-
ing that the program or activity being investigated was the recipient of direct
federal funding." In so deciding, the court narrowly construed the Depart-
ment's authority under Title IX.
The crucial question for the Richmond court was whether the "program"
in question received direct federal financial assistance. 72 The court held that any
69
 Id. at 324-25.
64 For a discussion of this concept as it applies to the instant situation see generally
Comment, Ultra Vices Challenge, supra note 6, at 150-84.
65
 543 F. Supp. at 324.
66
 For an analysis of the policy reasons behind this general practice see Comment, Ultra
Vices Challenge, supra note 6, at 151-52. See also North Haven, 456 U.S. at 522 n.12.
67
 543, F. Supp. at 325. The court noted that the regional director of the Office of Civil
Rights (who was in charge of the investigation and was a co-defendant in the suit) suggested, in
his deposition, that the receipt of even $1.00 in federal aid by a university would subject all its
programs or activities to the Department's authority. Id.
68 Id.
69 See, e.g., Bennett v. West Texas State Univ., 525 F. Supp. 77, 80 (N.D. Tex. 1981)
("To the extent that the regulations attempt to apply the strictures of Title IX on an institutional
basis, the regulations are invalid.); Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp 1376, 1391
(E.D. Mich. 1981). For courts of appeals had previously rejected assertions that Title IX applied
to employment practices and had invalidated the regulations as unauthorized by the statute. See
Seattle Univ. v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom. United States Dept. of
Educ. v. Seattle Univ., 102 S. Ct. 2264 (1982); Romeo County Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581
(6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Junior College Dist. of St. Louis v. Califano,
597 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Isleboro School Comm. v.
Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
543 F. Supp. at 333.
71 Id.
72 543 F. Supp. at 327 n.10. Similar conclusions have been reached in two other recent
Title IX cases involving the athletic regulations. See Bennett v. West Texas State Univ., 525 F.
Supp. 77, 81 (N.D. Tex. 1981) ("in order for strictures of Title IX to be triggered, the federal
financial assistance must be direct."); Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376, 1389
(E.D. Mich. 1981) ("direct federal financial aid to specific education programs or activities is re-
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attempt by the Department to regulate or inspect any "program" which is not
directly federally funded is unlawful and beyond the scope of Title IX and
Congress' intent." In reaching its decision, however, the court never addressed
the central issue in the case: it did not attempt to discern Congress' intent with
respect to indirect funding as a basis for jurisdiction. Rather, the court merely
noted the existence of the program-specific limitations embodied in sections
901 and 902, which provide that the prohibition and termination provisions are
limited in effect to programs or activities "receiving Federal financial assis-
tance." 74 Absent a determination of whether Congress, in using this. language,
intended indirectly funded programs to come within the ambit of Title IX,
however, the court would seem to have had no basis to support its ruling that
only directly funded programs are covered by the statute's proscriptions.
Even assuming that the court was correct in its determination that only
directly funded programs are covered by Title IX, it is of particular interest
that the court never defined exactly what constituted an "education program"
for the purposes of the statute, despite its heavy reliance on the program-
specific limitation of the statute." Furthermore, the court failed to define
"education program" even after noting that the Supreme Court had similarly
failed to define the term in North Haoen. 76 Without a definition of "education
program," however, it would seem to be impossible to determine exactly what
constituted direct funding to a program for purposes of Title IX. Instead of
specifically defining the term, the Richmond court, through its references to pro-
grams "earmarked for direct Federal Funding,"" seems to have implicitly
adopted a common sense definition. Under this definition it appears that an
athletic department is one program, a law school is another program, and a
political science research project is still another program. Accordingly, unless
funds received by a university were earmarked for a particular "program," the
Department would be unable to assert jurisdiction.
The importance of this approach cannot be overemphasized. By defining
"program" in this fashion, the court precluded the Department from asserting
quired before the strictures of Title IX can be applied.").
73
 543 F. Supp. at 327. The [Department's] practice in this matter under the guise of
their regulations is contrary to the language of the governing statute, the intent of Congress in
enacting Title IX, and the program specific ruling in North Haven." Id.
74 Id. at 325. "No person shall ... be subject to discrimination in any education pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance...." Education Amendments of 1972
5 901, 20 U.S.C. 1681 (1976); "such termination ... shall be limited in its effect to the par-
ticular program, or part thereof, in which noncompliance has been found .... " Id. at 5 902, 20
U.S.C. at $ 1682. See supra notes 2-3.
75
 The court focused solely on the word "program," having decided that "activity"
was a mere redundancy and not important in and of itself. 543 F. Supp. at 327 n.10.
76 Id. at 326. In North Haven, however, the Court was not faced with the question of ex-
actly what constituted an "education program or activity" for purposes of Title IX, as neither
school had objected to the investigation on grounds that the activities in question were not
federally funded. North Haven, 456 U.S. at 540.
77
 See Richmond, 543 F. Supp. at 328; id. at 331; id. at n.17.
1254	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 24:1243
jurisdiction over the University by virtue of the receipt of federal money given
to its students through the various federally administered grant and loan pro-
grams. These general funds are never earmarked for a specific program, but
instead go into the general operating budget of a university for the school's ad-
ministrators to spend as they see fit. For these funds to have become a basis of
jurisdiction for a Department investigation, the court would have had to have
adopted a broader definition of "program" for the purpose of these non-ear-
marked funds. Because the court was unwilling to accept the proposition that
the "program" funded by these funds was the University per se, the receipt of
these funds could not provide a jurisdictional basis for an investigation.
In its argument in Richmond, the Department had relied upon the case of
Bob Jones University v. Johnson," where an institutional approach had been ac-
cepted previously for purposes of Title VI enforcement. 79 In Bob Jones, a district
court was faced with the question of whether money from Veteran's Ad-
ministration loans which ultimately was received by a fundamentalist universi-
ty which engaged in racially discriminatory practices constituted "federal
financial assistance" for the purposes of Title VI. 8° In holding that the loans
did constitute federal assistance, the Bob Jones court determined that the mode
of payment to the ultimate beneficiary was irrelevant. So long as the federal
funds went ultimately to the university, the university was held to be subject to
the strictures of Title VI. 8 ' The Department asserted that a similar approach
was warranted in the Richmond case with respect to the BEOG and loan funds
received by the University from its students. 82 The Department further argued
that because the money so received went to the University generally, and not to
any specific program, then all of the University's programs were subject to the
strictures of Title IX.
The Richmond court dismissed the Department's reliance on Bob Jones,
however, noting that Title VI concerned race discrimination while Title IX
concerned only sex discrimination, and thus lacked the former's constitutional
scope." Similarly, the court rejected the contention that the Department had
7" 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd mem., 529 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1975).
" Id. Because Title IX was explicitly modeled on Title VI, Title VI litigation had been
considered relevant authority in previous Title IX cases. That has now been changed by the
Supreme Court's decision in North Haven. See infra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
8° Civil Rights Act of 1964 5 601, 42 U.S.C. 2000d (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
396 F. Supp. at 603. The court noted that:
Whether the cash payments are made to a university and thereafter distributed to
eligible veterans rather than the present mode of transmittal is irrelevant, since the
payments ultimately reach the same beneficiaries and the benefit to the university
would be the same in either event. To argue otherwise would be to suggest that the
applicability of Title VI turns on the role of a university as an exchange.... No ra-
tional distinction with respect to Title VI coverage can be made on this basis.
Id. at 603-04.
" 543 F. Supp. at 323 & n.5.
83 Id. at 328. "The broad reading in Bob Janes is not necessary in this case dealing with
Title IX. Title IX lacks the constitutional scope of Title VI." Id.
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jurisdiction over the athletic department because the athletic department bene-
fited from funds received by the University directly from various federal
sources. The Department had argued that the receipt of these federal funds
allowed other University funds to be used by the athletic department. The
court, however, dismissed this argument by noting that the aid, if any, was in-
direct." Finally, the court rejected the Department's argument that in order to
enforce the regulations, it must be able to investigate the University to deter-
mine whether the athletic department is a "program or activity" receiving
federal funding. The court dismissed this argument, characterizing it as
"double-talk and sophistry," and an attempt to revive the institutional ap-
proach through language manipulation—or as the court phrased it, "the same
old racoon with another ring around its tail." 85
Thus, the district court in Richmond denied the Department's motion for
summary judgment, while partially granting the University's motion. The
court ruled that an athletic program must receive funds directly from the feder-
al government before if can be held to compliance with Title IX' s proscriptions
against sex discrimination. The court did so, however, without addressing the
central issue of the case: namely, whether or not Congress intended indirectly
aided programs to come under the proscriptions of Title IX when it enacted the
statute. Furthermore, the court never explicitly ruled what constituted an
"education program" for purposes of the statute, thereby precluding any at-
tempt to determine whether or not a "program" is receiving direct federal
financial assistance.
B. Haffer v. Temple University
Plaintiffs, eight women students at Temple, a private university, filed a
class action claiming that Temple discriminated against women in its inter-
collegiate athletic program in violation of Title IX and the implementing regu-
lations." Temple moved for summary judgment, asserting that the regulations
" Id. at 328-29. See also Bennett v. West Texas State Univ., 525 F. Supp. 77, 80-81
(N.D. Tex. 1981) ("Plaintiff's contention ... that the athletic programs of the University arc
directly benefitted by federal financial assistance because those programs received funds that
would otherwise be diverted without the infusion of federal monies ... is not well taken.");
Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376, 1389 (F.D. Mich. 1981) ("Plaintiff argues
that the school board receives federal impact aid which is put into the general fund and that this
benefits the athletic program. The court rejects the plaintiff's argument that (this) ... brings it
within the ambit of Title IX ... "). But see Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418, 424 (6th
Cir. 1982); Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Hufstedlcr, 499 F. Supp. 496, 503 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aff'd
sub nom. Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 445 (5th Cir, 1981), vacated, 102 S. Ct.
3475 (1982), aff'd on rehearing sub nom, Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Heckler, 702 F.2d 549 (5th Cir.
1983) ("As a matter of law . . . this regulation, though it may reach activities once-removed from
direct federal assistance, is nevertheless useful and necessary to the effectuation of Title IX.");
Wort v. Vieriing, No. 82-3169, slip op. at 4 (C.D. Ill. 1982) ("Because of the integral relation-
ship between NHS and the school-recipient and its faculty, NHS would not exist without the
school itself, . . Accordingly, Title IX is applicable to this case.")
O 543 F. Supp. at 331.
Haffer, 524 F. Supp. at 532. Temple maintains sepamte athletic programs for men
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were invalid because the claimed coverage was beyond the scope of Congress'
intent in enacting Title IX." Specifically, Temple argued that (1) the terms
"program" and "activity" refer solely to the component parts of an institu-
tion, so that Temple as a whole could never be deemed a program or activity
for purposes of Title IX; (2) Title IX applies only to directly funded component
programs; and (3) the regulations are invalid insofar as they attempt to cover
component programs which do not receive direct federal funding. 88
Plaintiffs asserted that the regulations were indeed valid and that Temple
was subject to their strictures. According to affidavits, Temple received ap-
proximately ten percent of its annual operating budget from federal sources,"
although none of the federal funds were earmarked for the intercollegiate ath-
letic program. 9° Plaintiffs' primary contention was that this extensive federal
funding, which reached throughout the University, was sufficient in and of it-
self to subject Temple to the constraints of Title IX in all its education pro-
grams, including intercollegiate athletics." Alternatively, Plaintiffs argued that
Temple's athletic department received direct federal financial assistance in
three separate forms: (1) as federal grants and loans to its student-athletes; (2)
as federal assistance for the construction and renovation of facilities used by the
athletic program, including dormitories used by student-athletes and campus
buildings used for athletic award functions; and (3) as salaries of athletic de-
partment employees paid under federally funded work-study and CETA pro-
grams. 92
In its opinion, the district court focused on the meaning of the phrase
"programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance" found in section
901. The court determined that the validity of the regulations in question turned
on the intent of Congress in using the word "receiving." 93 After a substantial
review of Title IX's legislative history, the court concluded that Temple's in-
and women. Id. at 532 n.1. They have separate budgets, administrations, and coaches. Id. The
suit and motions concerned Temple's total involvement in intercollegiate athletics. Id. Plaintiffs
contended inter alia that Temple was not in compliance with the provision of 34 C.F.R . § 106.41,
which mandated proportional spending on intercollegiate athletic programs, as women com-
prised 42 percent of all athletes at Temple yet received only 13 percent of all funds spent on ath-
letics. Id. at 532.
87 Id. at 532.
88
	 Amid/ Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 2-3, Haffer v. Temple Univ.,
688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982).
89 Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 18, at 1. For the 1980-81 school year this aid
amounted to almost $20 million in direct federal grants and contracts. Id. at 2. In addition, Tem-
ple students received over $10 million in federal financial aid, which ultimately was received by
Temple as tuition payments and student fees. Id. at 1-2. Further, in prior years Temple had
received federal grants of over $7 million to finance construction and renovation of classrooms.
Id. at 2. Substantial amounts of low-interest, long-term loans had also been received, and were
still being repaid, to finance the construction of dormitories. Id.
9° Heifer, 524 F. Supp. at 532.
" Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 18, at 40.
92 Id. at 3-10, 41.
" Haffer, 524 F. Supp. at 532-33.
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tercollegiate athletic program is an education program "receiving federal
financial assistance" and thus subject to the dictates of both Title IX and the
regulations."
According to the court, "[ijt is obvious from a full reading of the legisla-
tive history of the statute that Congress approved of the broad scope of Title
IX, and specifically its application to intercollegiate athletic programs. " 95 The
court discounted the usefulness of the available pre-enactment history for its
determination because it found the history of the bill through enactment am-
biguous." In the post-enactment period, however, the court found at least six
attempts to amend Title IX to exclude, in whole or in part, coverage of athletic
programs or to limit coverage solely to directly funded programs, all of which
had been defeated." Furthermore, the court found two instances where Con-
gress had amended Title IX to exclude from its coverage certain educational
programs. 98
Based upon its reading of the relevant legislative and post-enactment
history, the district court reached two conclusions. First, the court concluded
that Congress was aware that programs which received indirect funding were
regarded as within Title IX's coverage, and approved that interpretation."
Second, because of the tremendous furor that the proposed regulations created
before and during the "laying before" period,'" the court determined that
Congress could not have been unaware of the hot debate over the proposed
coverage of indirectly funded athletic programs.'°' If Congress had not in-
tended Title IX to cover these programs, it could have disapproved the regula-
tions.'" At the very least, Congress could have amended Title IX to exclude
athletics from its scope as it had done for several other indirectly funded educa-
tion programs. 1 °3 Because Congress took no action of disapproval, however,
the court ruled that Congress thereby, implicitly at least, approved of the
regulations as they stood.'" Consequently, the court ruled that Temple's
94
 Id. at 533-34.
95
 Id. at 534.
96 Id.
" Id. at 534-35. For a discussion of the attempts to exclude athletics from Title IX and
the reasons for their defeat see infra notes 187-248 and accompanying text.
" 524 F. Supp. at 535. In 1974 Congress amended Title [X to exclude from its cover-
age the membership practices of social fraternities and sororities, YMCA's and YWCA's, the
Girl and Boy Scouts, the Camp Fire Girls, and traditionally single-sex voluntary youth service
organizations. 20 U.S.C. 1681(a)(6) (1976). In 1976 Congress excluded American Legion-
sponsored Boys and Girls State and Nation Programs, father-son and mother-daughter ban-
quets, and beauty pageant scholarships. 20 U.S.C. 1681(a)(7)-(9) (1976).
99 524 F. Supp. at 536.
'°° See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
1 °' 524 F. Supp. at 536.
1 " Id.
103
 See supra note 98.
104
 524 F. Supp. at 536. Effective August 21, 1975, Congress amended 5 431(d)(1) of the
General Education Provisions Act to provide that failure to disapprove regulations does not con-
stitute a finding of consistency with legislative intent regarding the underlying statute. 20 U.S.C.
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receipt of indirect general aid was sufficient to subject it to Title IX's guide-
lines, which had been promulgated validly.' 05 The court did qualify its opinion
in one respect, however, noting in dicta that the amount of funding must be a
reasonable amount; merely de minimus federal aid would not subject a universi-
ty as a whole to the strictures of Title IX. 105
As an alternative holding, the court also ruled that Temple's athletic de-
partment received direct federal assistance through the machinations of the
various federal aid programs which granted financial aid to student-athletes
and athletic department employees.'" According to the court, this direct assis-
tance included funds received by athletic department employees under the
work-study program; work-study and CETA funds for employees of the Uni-
versity radio station, which broadcast athletic contests; federal grants and loans
received by student-athletes at the University; and federal funds used for the
construction and maintenance of buildings utilized by the athletic department
and student-athletes.'° 8 Thus, because it determined that Congress had intend-
ed that indirectly aided programs come under Title IX's proscriptions and,
alternatively, because it determined that Temple received direct federal aid,
the court denied Temple's motion for summary judgment.
Temple appealed the court's denial of its motion to the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, where a three judge panel affirmed in a per curiam opinion.'"
In its appeal, Temple had requested certification of a question which chal-
lenged the district court's interpretation of the phrase "education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance. ""° In its opinion, the Court of
Appeals upheld the lower court's interpretation of the statutory language, rul-
ing that it was bound, according to internal policy, by another Third Circuit
panel's decision in a prior Title IX case."'
$ 1232(d) (Supp. V 1981). The amendment took effect, however, after the regulations had be-
come effective. The rules in effect at the time when Congress was considering the athletic regula-
tions support the implication that Congress, by its inaction, approved of the Department's inter-
pretation contained therein. 524 F. Supp. at 536 n.10.
1 " 524 F. Supp. at 541.
'" Id. at 540.
Id.
as Id .
'" Haller v. Temple Univ., 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982).
I° Id. at 16. The exact question certified asked:
Whether the phrase "education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance" as used in Section 901 „ . includes programs or activities, such as Tem-
ple University's intercollegiate athletics program, which do not themselves receive
earmarked Federal financial assistance, if such programs or activities benefit from
the receipt of Federal financial assistance by other parts of the University and/or by
students enrolled at the University.
Id.
111 Id. at 16 n.6. "Opinions of one panel of this Court are binding on subsequent
panels. See 3d Cir. Internal Operating Procedures, Rule VIII(C)." Id.
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The decision in this prior case, Grove City College v. Be11, 112 had come down
after oral arguments had been heard on Temple's appeal. 113 The issue in Grove
City was whether a private college which received no direct federal funds, but
whose students received federal grants under the BEOG program, was covered
by Title IX."* After analyzing the statute, its legislative history, and the rele-
vant case law, the Grove City appellate court concluded that Title IX was indeed
triggered when students receive BEOG funds which are subsequently chan-
nelled to an educational institution."' The court also determined that when
Title IX applies to a school by virtue of money received through its students,
then the "program" funded for purposes of the statute is the entire .university,
because to rule otherwise would defeat the purpose of the statute." 6
"2 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983).
13 Haller, 688 F.2d at 16.
687 F.2d at 687. Grove City presents a unique factual situation. Grove City College is
a private co-educational Pennsylvania college affiliated with the United Presbyterian Church. Id.
at 688. The college had, since its founding, refused to accept any form of direct governmental
financial assistance. Id. at 689 n,7. Of the college's approximately 2,200 students, some 140
received some funds under the BEOG program, while 342 received aid through the GSL pro-
gram. Id. at 688. The students received the funds directly from the lending institution after the
college had certified the validity of their educational costs and enrollment status. Id. at 689 n.8.
In July, 1976 the Department attempted to secure from the College an Assurance of Compliance
that the College was in compliance with Title IX. Id. at 689. The College refused to execute the
Assurance, asserting that it received no federal assistance for purposes of Title IX. Id. The
Department then initiated administrative proceedings, pursuant to section 902, to terminate the
federal grants and loans given to the students attending the College. Id.
After a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge concluded that the College was a recipi-
ent of federal financial assistance for purposes of Title IX, and that the loans and grants to the
students could be terminated because of the college's refusal to execute the Assurance. Id. As the
College continued to refuse to execute the Assurance, the judge issued an order terminating the
aid to the students. Id. In November, 1978, Grove City, joined by several of its student-recipi-
ents, filed suit seeking an injunction to prevent the Department from terminating the students'
aid and to enjoin the Department from requiring the school to execute the assurance. Id. They
also sought a judgment declaring the regulations void as beyond the statutory grant of authority,
or alternatively, unconstitutional as applied to the College. Id. Cross motions for summary judg-
ment were filed based on affidavits and the administrative record. Id.
The district court granted Grove City's motion for summary judgment and denied the
cross motion of the Department. Grove City College v. Harris, 500 F. Supp. 253, 274 (W.D. Pa.
1980). Although the court agreed that the BEOG's and GSL's received by the College's students
constituted "federal financial assistance" to Grove City for purposes of Title IX, id. at 266, it
ruled that the Department could not terminate assistance to students, based on the College's
failure to sign the Assurance, absent proof of actual sex discrimination. Id. at 268-72.
The Department's appeal, and Grove City's cross appeal followed. 687 F.2d at 690. The
Department appealed from the judgment, while the College cross-appealed to preserve its con-
tention that the acceptance of federal aid by its students did not bring the College within the am-
bit of Title IX. Id. at 690 n.11.
115 687 F.2d at 698-700. Accord, Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418, 430 (6th Cir.
1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3704 (U.S. March 16, 1983) (No. 82-1538).
16 687 F.2d at 698. "However 'program' may be defined when a direct federal grant is
involved . . . we are not persuaded that when non-earmarked or indirect funding is involved, those
statutes proscribing discrimination should be rendered ineffective and without force." Id. But see
Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418, 430 (6th Cir. 1982). In Hillsdale, the Sixth Circuit was
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The Haffer appellate court, relying on the Grove City appellate decision,
ruled that the district court in Hoffer had concluded correctly that Temple's
athletic department had received federal financial assistance within the mean-
ing of Title IX, because money received as general funds by the University
freed nonfederal funds which could then be allocated to the athletic depart-
ment."' The appellate court expressed no opinion, however, concerning the
lower court's alternative holding that the athletic department was covered by
Title IX because some of the federal funding was closely connected to the
athletic department." 9
The decisions of the various federal courts regarding the validity of the
Title IX athletic regulations are in conflict. The athletic sections of the regula-
tions are now invalid in several judicial districts; 119 valid and narrowly con-
strued in the Eastern District of Virginia;' 20 valid, binding, and broadly ap-
plied in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware, the area under the jurisdic-
tion of the Third Circuit;'" and in doubt everywhere else. Recently, in the case
of North Haven Board of Education v, Be11, 122
 the Supreme Court established
guidelines for the interpretation of Congressional intent in Title IX cases.
Because of the importance of the North Haven decision in this area, and because
the parties in both Richmond and Haffer were unable to brief their arguments
fully in light of North Haven,'" the next section will be devoted to an analysis of
the Supreme Court's opinion in North Haven. This note will then evaluate the
availiable legislative and postenactment history in light of the guidelines that
have been established by the Court for Title IX interpretation.'" Finally, the
Richmond and Haffer decisions will be reexamined to determine which is more
consonant with both. Congressional intent in enacting Title IX' and the
Supreme Court's guidelines regarding the interpretation of that intent.'"
faced with a set of facts essentially identical to those in Grove City. In its opinion, the Hillsdale court
ruled that student aid was sufficient to bring a university within the purview of Title IX, id., but
that the only program subject to regulation by virtue of this money was the grant and loan pro-
gram itself. Id. Thus, the Department could not terminate the student aid because the Assurance
of Compliance covered the entire college and not just the student grant and loan programs. Id.
1 " Haffer v. Temple Univ., 688 F.2d 14, 17 (3d Cir. 1982).
18 Id. at 17 n.9. The circuit court did not need to decide this question, because its
disposition on the other issue made resolution of the direct funding issue unnecessary. See supra
notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
1 " This invalidity is by virtue of the decisions in Bennett v. West Texas State Univ., 525
F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Tex. 1981) and Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D.
Mich. 1981).
120 This is by virtue of Richmond, 543 F. Supp. 321.
1 " This is by virtue of Haffer, 688 F.2d 14.
122 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
' 2 ' The parties in both cases were able, however, to submit memoranda addressing the
implications of North Haven to their positions. See Richmond, 543 F. Supp. at 333 n.19; Letter
Memorandum of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 1, Haffer v. Temple Univ., 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982).
' 24 See infra notes 171-248 and accompanying text.
125 See infra notes 249-52 and accompanying text.
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III. NORTH HAVEN BOARD OF EDUCATION v. BELL
In North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 126
 the Supreme Court was faced
with a challenge to the Department's Title IX "subpart E" regulations, which
concern the employment practices of educational institutions.'" The North
Haven decision is significant in several respects, most notably because the
Supreme Court adopted what was then the minority position in holding that
the Title IX regulations were valid as promulgated. Furthermore, the Court
altered the manner in which Congressional intent was determined in Title IX
cases, discounting not only the relevance of Title VI's legislative and enforce-
ment history, but also the import of Senator Bayh's abortive attempt to intro-
duce his 1971 amendment, both of which had been relied upon heavily in pre-
vious Title IX cases. Although the Court, in North Haven, was not concerned
with Title IX's athletic regulations per se, the Court's opinion did establish the
basic guidelines for determining Congressional intent in enacting Title IX.
Petitioners in North Haven were two Connecticut public school boards, the
North Haven Board of Education and the Trumbull Board of Education.'"
The two school boards brought separate suits in federal district court challeng-
ing the Department's authority to issue the Subpart E regulations.'" In their
suits, which were joined on appeal, both petitioners asserted that Congress did
not intend Title IX to reach employment practices."° Because the two district
court cases are similar factually, only the North Haven district court proceedings
will be discussed in the text."'
The litigation in North Haven arose out of a complaint filed with the
Department in January 1978 by Elaine Dove, a tenured teacher in the North
Haven school system, alleging that the school board had violated Title IX by
refusing to rehire her after a one year maternity leave.'" The Department
126 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
127 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.51-.61 (1982).
"8 456 U.S. at 517.
j2° Id.
' 3° Id.
The facts in the Trumbull case can be quickly stated. In October 1977, Linda Potz, a
former guidance counselor in the Trumbull school system, filed a complaint with the Department
against the Trumbull Board of Education. 456 U.S. at 518. The complaint alleged that the school
board had discriminated against her with respect to job assignments, working conditions, and
contract renewal. Id. After an investigation, which the school board cooperated with, the Depart-
ment determined that the board had violated Title IX and directed the board to take corrective
action, including the reinstatement of Potz with back pay. Id. Specifically, the investigation
revealed that the school board had required Potz to perform secrerarial tasks not required of the
male counterparts; had demeaned her in the eyes of her co-workers and counsellees; had required
her to falsify a Title IX compliance report concerning her job duties and work load; and had fired
her solely because of her sex. Brief for Respondent Linda Potz at 2, North Haven Board of
Education v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982). The school board then filed suit in district court, con-
tending the regulations were invalid and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief identical to that
granted in the North Haven case. 456 U.S. at 518. Once again the district court agreed that the
Department had exceeded its statutory grant of authority and granted the relief sought. Id.
'" 456 U.S. at 517.
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processed the complaint, claiming authority by virtue of subpart E of its
regulations, and initiated an investigation into the school board's employment
practices.'" As part of its investigation, the Department requested from the
school board certain information concerning its policies on hiring, seniority,
leaves of absence, and tenure."'" The school board refused to comply with the
information request, arguing that the Department lacked authority under Title
IX to regulate employment.'"
After the Department notified the board that it was considering adminis-
trative enforcement proceedings, the school board filed suit seeking a declara-
tory judgment that the Subpart E regulations were beyond the scope of the De-
partment's statutory authority, and an injunction forbidding the Department
from initiating funding termination proceedings.' 36 The district court, agreeing
with the school board that Title IX was not intended to reach employment
practices, invalidated the regulations and enjoined the Department from initi-
ating termination proceedings.'"
A. The Circuit Court Opinion
The two cases were consolidated on appeal, and the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reversed.'" After finding the language of section 901 un-
clear and inconclusive, the appellate court examined the available legislative
history, and concluded that Title IX was indeed intended to prohibit employ-
ment discrimination.'" The court also determined that the Subpart E regula-
tions were consistent with section 902, ruling that the "pinpoint termination
provision" of section 902 applied only to fund terminations per se, and did not
limit the Department's authority to issue regulations prohibiting sex discrimi-
nation in educational employment.'" Furthermore, if on investigation the De-
partment determined that there were funds which would be subject to termina-
tion going to a school, the Department would not be required, prior to the ter-
mination, to specify which particular programs receiving financial assistance
were covered by the regulations."' Because the Department had not exercised
its termination authority with respect to the two school boards, however, the
court declined to decide whether or not the Department could do so in these
cases. Instead, it remanded the cases for a determination of whether the school
boards had violated the regulations, and, if so, what remedies were appropri-
ate.'" The school boards then petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari.
'" Id.
"4 Id.
I" Id.
'" Id. at 518.
'37 Id.
'" North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedlcr, 629 F.2d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1980).
139 Id. at 785.
140 Id. at 785-86.
' 4 ' Id. at 785.
142 Id.
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Because four other Courts of Appeals had invalidated the regulations previous-
ly on the grounds that Title IX did not authorize coverage of employment prac-
tices,' 43 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.'"
B. The Supreme Court Opinion
In its North Haven opinion, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the
regulations with respect to employment. The Court agreed with both the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the Department that Title IX prohibited
sex discrimination against both students and employee3. 145 The Court reached
this conclusion after an examination of the relevant statutory language, legisla-
tive history, and postenactment history. 146 The Court disagreed, however,
with the appellate court's interpretation of the program-specific limitation of
Title IX. Whereas the lower court had ruled that the program-specific limita-
tion affected only the termination provisions of section 902 and did not affect
the authority of the Department to promulgate regulations, 147 the Supreme
Court ruled that the authority of the Department to both issue and enforce Ti-
tle IX regulations was limited by the program-specific language. 1 " " Certainly,
it makes little sense," the Court stated, "to interpret the statute ... to author-
ize an agency to promulgate rules that it cannot enforce."'" According to the
Court, though the regulations may be worded broadly and need not be directed
at specific programs, they can be applied validly only to programs that receive
federal financial assistance.' 5 °
The import of this ruling is ambiguous. In adopting the program-specific
limitation, the Court observed that "Congress failed to adopt proposals that
would have prohibited all discriminatory practices of an institution that re-
ceives federal funds.' " 51 Rather, the prohibition adopted was specifically
limited to "programs or activities receiving Federal financial assistance."' 52
' 43 See supra note 69.
1 " North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 450 U.S. 909 (1981).
" 5 456 U.S. at 530.
16 Id. at 520-35.
1 " North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 785-86 (2d Cir. 1980).
"u 456 U.S. at 536-38. "We conclude, then, that an agency's authority under Title IX
to both promulgate regulations and to terminate funds is subject to the program-specific limita-
tion of §.§ 901 and 902." Id. at 538.
"5 Id. at 537.
150 Id. at 536 11.27.
"I Id. at 537.
1 " Id. The Court noted that the 1971 version of the amendment had prohibited
discrimination in all areas of an institution, while the 1972 version, the one ultimately adopted,
prohibited discrimination only in federally funded programs. Id. The Court found this distinc-
tion significant and indicative of a Congressional change of heart with respect to the scope of Title
IX. Id. It is unclear, however, whether this change was a result of a conscious choice to limit the
scope of the statute or merely the by-product of the use of Title VI as the model for what was
adopted as Title IX. No reason has apparently ever been given for the change and each alter-
native seems equally plausible, although, as noted above, the Court has decided the issue in favor
of the former. Id.
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Yet the Supreme Court expressly declined to define "program" in its opinion,
leaving the definition to the lower courts on remand. 153 The Court also had no
opportunity to rule on whether indirect funding is sufficient to bring an institu-
tion under the aegis of Title IX, and if so, what is the program or activity
funded. This was because neither school board had asserted that the complain-
ing employees did not work in an education program that received federal as-
sistance.' 54 Rather, the Court merely determined that the regulations them-
selves required program-specific application, and thus were not facially invalid
as had been asserted by the plaintiffs.'" Thus, the main question plaguing the
courts in the athletics contexts were left unanswered in North Haven. Several
sections of the opinion do provide indications, however, about the proper
resolution of the questions.
The most important aspect of the Court's opinion in North Haven, for the
resolution of Title IX questions, is the procedure the Court established for
Title IX interpretation. The starting point in determining the scope of Title IX
is of course, the statutory language.I 56 Generally, Title IX must be accorded
"a sweep ,as broad as its language."'" Because Title IX leaves much unde-
fined, however, a second step, an examination of the legislative history, will
likely be necessary in all but the most obvious of cases to clarify the import of
the language.'" Unfortunately, the legislative history itself is, as the Court
noted, sparse at best.' 5° Thus, additional evidence of the intended scope of
Title IX can be obtained from the postenactment history. 16° The Court noted
that although postenactment history cannot be given " 'the weight of contem-
porary legislative history, we would be remiss if we ignored these authoritative
expressions concerning the scope and purpose of Title IX ....' In addi-
tion, the Court specifically noted the importance of amendatory bills and
legislative hearings on those bills. The Court noted that when an agency's
statutory interpretation had been brought to the attention of both the public
and the Congress, and Congress had not sought to alter that interpretation,
although it had amended the statute in other respects, then presumably the
legislative intent had been correctly discerned by the agency.'"
Also significant for future Title IX cases is the Court's ruling regarding
the importance and relevance of Title VI's legislative history and previous en-
155 Id. at 539-40.
1 " Id. at 540.
"5 Id. at 538-39.
"s Id. at 520.
'" Id. at 521 (citations omitted).
156 See id. at 530 n.21.
159 Id. at 527. "Senator Bayh's remarks, as those • of the sponsor of the language
ultimately enacted ... are the only authoritative indications of congressional intent regarding the
scope of SS 901 and 902." Id. at 526-27.
16° See id. at 530-35.
16' Id. at 535 (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 687 n.7 (1979)).
162
 Id.
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forcement record. In most of the Title IX cases up to and including North
Haven, much of the attention in both the briefs and opinions had focused on
Title VI's legislative history and the manner in which courts had previously in-
terpreted and enforced the title and its implementing regulations. 153 This was
because Title IX had been explicitly and consciously modeled on Title VI.'"
Indeed, the Supreme Court had specifically approved of this approach in a
previous Title IX case, Cannon v. University of Chicago. 165 In Cannon, the Court
had noted that "because of their repeated references to Title VI ... we are
especially justified in presuming both that those representatives were aware of
the prior interpretation of Title VI and that that interpretation reflects their in-
tent with respect to Title IX. 166
In North Haven, however, the Court reversed itself on this issue by dis-
counting the value of Title VI history in Title IX cases. The Court ruled that
Title IV history is of little, if any, use in discerning Congress' intent with re-
spect to Title IX, and that the focus on the history of Title VI in Title IX
analysis was in error."' According to the Court, "[ilt is Congress' intention in
1972, not in 1964, that is of significance in interpreting Title IX . ... The
meaning and applicability of Title VI are useful guides in construing Title IX,
therefore, only to the extent that the language and history of Title IX do not
suggest a contrary interpretation. "168
Finally, the North Haven Court ruled that the Title IX regulations should
not be given the deference usually allowed an implementing agency's statutory
interpretation, because the Department had not consistently interpreted the
statute. 169 Indeed, not only had the Department's interpretation of Title IX, as
embodied in the regulations, varied from case to case, but the Department also
had altered its interpretation as the North Haven case had progressed."° Thus,
in Title IX cases, courts will be allowed greater latitude in determining what
the proper statutory interpretation should be than normally would be allowed
where the implementing agency had already given its imprimatur to the legisla-
tion.
In sum, the Court, in North Haven, established a three step process to be
used in determining Congressional intent in future Title IX litigation. First,
examine the statutory language itself. If the language proves ambiguous, next
examine the legislative history of the Act for evidence of what Congress meant
when it used the statutory language. Finally, the postenactment history of Title
' 63 See, for example, Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376, 1387-89 (E.D.
Mich. 198!); Brief Arnici Curiae, supra note 80, at 11-47; Brief, supra note 18, at 13.17, 26-28.
164 Cannon V. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696 (1979).
' 66 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
166
 Id. at 697-98.
' 67
 456 U.S. at 529.
166
169 Id. at 538 n.29.
170 Id.
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IX may be examined for additional evidence of Congress' intent in passing the
statute. In an attempt to determine what should be the proper interpretation of
Title IX regarding the coverage of athletics, this note, following the North
Haven guidelines, will next examine the relevant portions of the statute's
legislative and postenactment history. Through this examination, the note will
attempt to determine if Congress intended athletic programs, or indeed any in-
directly funded programs, to come under the aegis of Title IX.
IV. LEGISLATIVE AND POST-ENACTMENT HISTORY OF TITLE IX:
ARE ATHLETIC PROGRAMS COVERED?
In determining whether athletic programs are covered by Title IX, the
first step in the North Haven approach, direct reference to the statutory
language, is of little assistance. Although the statute provides that only a "pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance" is covered by Title IX,
"program or activity" is left undefined. "Federal financial assistance" is
similarly neglected, while the prospect of indirect funding is completely ig-
nored, Although athletics are not specifically included in the statute, neither
are they excluded, as are several other education programs."' Yet, as was
noted in North Haven, the fact that some activities were exempted from Title
IX's coverage while others were considered and left intact may be persuasive,
but it is not conclusive. 12 Consequently, further investigation into legislative
intent is necessary.
The second step in the North Haven approach, an examination of the
statute's legislative history, sheds little light regarding Congress' intent on the
statute's coverage of athletics. Because Title IX was introduced as a floor
amendment, the available legislative history is sparse. 373 There are no commit-
tee reports, save a few unenlightening sections of the Conference report. 174 In
the Senate, there was little floor discussion of the bill or its provisions. The few
remarks which are available are largely the prepared remarks of Senator Bayh,
and most of these had been inserted into the record subsequent to the amend-
ment's passage.' 75
Nevertheless, an examination of the history is of some, albeit limited,
benefit. According to the Senator's introductory remarks, the amendment was
designed to eliminate, to the fullest extent possible, sex discrimination in edu-
cation.'" The prohibition was limited, however, to federally funded educa-
'" See supra note 98.
'" 456 U.S. at 533 - 35.
'" See supra note 159.
1 " See, S. Con. Rep. 798, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 221 - 22, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2608, 2670 - 72.
"5 See 121 CONG. REG. 5803-15. The Supreme Court has noted, however, that Senator
Bayh's remarks "are the only authoritative indications of congressional intent regarding the
scope of $.5 901 and 902." North Haven, 456 U.S. at 526 -27.
16 121 CONG. REC. 5803, 5804. "I urge the Senate to adopt this amendment which [is]
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tional programs, " 7
 although exactly what constitutes federal funding or an
educational program was not discussed. The only specific mention of athletics
was a passing reference to an anticipated exemption for the integration of
"sports facilities," which presumably meant locker room 8.' 78 In one exchange,
Senator Bayh, responding to a question, noted that: "we are dealing with
discrimination in admission to an institution, discrimination of available serv-
ices or studies within an institution once students are admitted . . In the area
of services, once a student is accepted within an institution, we permit no ex-
ceptions. "179
 Conceivably the reference to services could be interpreted to ap-
ply to athletic programs. A more logical explanation, however, is that the refer-
ence was to the traditional areas of services, such as guidance counselors,
financial aid, and research facilities.
The record in the House on its sister bill to Senator Bayh's amendment,
H.R. 7248, 1 " though more developed, is no less ambiguous with respect to the
coverage of athletics. Indeed, ambiguity and confusion seemed to be the norm
in the discussions on the bill's scope. The coverage of athletics was never
discussed specifically. In the bill's introductory statements there is some indica-
tion that the word "program" was meant to encompass institutions, and not
just individual programs such as school lunches or federal research grants. 18 '
The available remarks, however, are ambiguous and inconclusive. For exam-
ple, Rep. Boland, in his introductory remarks, noted that "The bill includes
title X [the House bill's equivalent of title IX] on discrimination in educational
programs. This title reaches beyond higher education and is applicable to all
education programs, including elementary and secondary. ,,182
Attempts to define "program or activity" and to discern whether indirect
funding comes under the aegis of Title IX did arise later to some degree, but
the discussion in the few attempts undertaken is less than illuminating. During
discussion on an amendment to the bill, for example, Rep. Green, who was the
sponsor and floor manager of the bill, and several other Congressmen ex-
changed opinions about the extent of the coverage of the Title.'" A careful
... designed to root out, as thoroughly as possible at the present time, the social evil of sex
discrimination in education." Id. (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
'" Id. at 5807.
76
 Id. "The regulations would allow enforcing agencies to permit ?differential treatment
by sex only—very unusual cases where such treatment is absolutely necessary for the success of
the program—such as in . sports facilities or other instances where personal privacy must be
preserved." Id.
1 " Id. at 5812.
180
 H.R. 7248, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REC. 39,098-99 (1971).
See id.
182
 Id. at 39,099.
" 3
 121 CONG. REC. 39,256 (1971). At one point, trying to clarify what was covered,
Rep. Waggoner had the following exchange with Rep. Green:
Mr. Waggoner. Let me clarify a little bit better the point I am trying to make and
that is this: This applies, apparently, only to those programs wherein the Federal
Government is in part or in whole financing a program or an activity?
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reading of the exchanges, however, clarifies nothing. Indeed, they really only
serve to make the already murky language of the statute even muddier.' 84
Given the limited extent of the relevant legislative history, the third step of
the North Haven approach is necessary if clarification is to be obtained. Indeed,
legal commentators and the few courts that have considered the issue have rec-
ognized that neither the statutes nor the available legislative history resolve the
question of what is a "program or activity" for purposes of Title IX) Nor
does the language or history resolve whether indirect funding subjects a univer-
sity to the Title IX guidelines, or if athletic programs are to be covered. For
answers to these questions a thorough examination of the available postenact-
ment history is required) 86 Fortunately, this inquiry proves to be of
significantly greater assistance.
Mrs. Green. With Federal funds.
Mr. Waggoner. That is what I mean, Federal Funds.
Id, Then, a little later on, as Rep. Steiger was attempting to further clarify the previous ex-
change, the following was said:
Mr. Steiger. In title X the gentleman from Louisiana asked relating to a program
on [sic] activities receiving Federal financial assistance, and under the "program on
activity" one could not discriminate. That is not to be read, am I correct, that it is
limited in terms of its application, that is, title X, to only programs that are federally
financed? For example, are we saying that if in the English department they receive
no funds from the Federal Government that therefore that program is exempt?
Mrs. Green. If the gentleman will yield, the answer is in the affirmative. Enforce-
ment is limited to each entity or institution and to each program and activity.
Discrimination would cut off all program funds within an institution.
Mr. Steiger. So that the effect of title X is to, in effect, go across the board in
terms of cutting off of funds to an institution that would discriminate, is that correct?
Mrs. Green. The purpose is of title Xis to end discrimination in all institutions of
higher education, yes, across the board.
Id.
' 84 One commentator concludes that "consideration of the dialogue in toto leads one to
no conclusion other than that the relevant legislative history is hopelessly ambiguous," Com-
ment, Ultra Vires Challenge, supra note 6, at 172. Another commentator, however, has been able to
conclude that the passages indicate "that a liberal interpretation of the particular program provi-
sion was intended." Cox, supra note 6, at 39 n.35.
'" See, e.g., Grove City, 687 F.2d at 698; Kuhn, supra note 6, at 73-76; Comment, supra
note 8, at 578.
1e6
	 weight that should be accorded the abortive bills and resolutions and the accom-
panying discussions which constitute the post-enactment history is unclear. The North Haven
Court has noted that though they cannot be given "'the weight of contemporary legislative
history,' " they are nonetheless " 'authorative expressions concerning the scope and purpose of
Title IX.'" 456 U.S. at 535 (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 687 n.7
(1979)). See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text. In North Haven, however, the postenact-
ment history was being used to provide additional evidence of Congress' intent regarding the
coverage of employment beyond what was contained in the statutory language and the contem-
porary history. 456 U.S. at 530-31, Here, on the other hand, the postenactment history is being
presented as the only available evidence of congressional intent. Because there is no language or
legislative history that addresses the direct-indirect funding and athletics issues, it is submitted
that the postenactment history in the instant case should be accorded weight at least as great as it
was accorded in North Haven. Indeed, as it is the only authoritative guide to congressional intent
regarding the two issues, greater weight than was allocated in North Haven would seem to be war-
ranted.
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A. Indirect Funding and Title IX
In general, the postenactment history of Title IX demonstrates that Con-
gress intended to include indirectly funded programs within the scope of Title
IX.' 87 Congress was fully aware that in the regulations the Department had
construed the phrase "federal financial assistance" to include indirect funding,
including student aid. During the mandated Congressional review of the Title
IX regulations, 188 the subject was addressed specifically by then HEW
Secretary Weinberger in hearings on the regulations:
Our view was that student assistance, assistance that the Government fur-
nishes, that goes directly or indirectly to an institution is Government aid
within the meaning of Title IX. If it is not, there is an easy remedy. Simply
tell us it is not. We believe it is and base our assumption on that. 189
In response to this proposed interpretation, Senator Helms introduced a
resolution, prior to the expiration of the 45 day "laying before" period, that
would have disapproved the regulations because they did not limit Title IX ap-
plication to directly funded "programs or activities," and thereby contravened
what Senator Helms believed had been the intent of Congress in enacting Title
IX.'" The resolution was never reported out of commit tee.' 9 ' During the same
period, several other resolutions were introduced in both houses of Congress
that also would have disapproved the regulations in their entirety, yet none was
passed."' Although Congress' failure to approve the resolutions does not
establish that it considered the regulations to be consistent with Title IX, it
does lend weight to that argument.'"
Further evidence that Congress intended Title IX to cover indirect pro-
grams comes from exchanges during the hearings on the regulations.'" The
purpose of the hearings was explained by Representative O'Hara, the chair-
man of the subcommittee conducting the hearings, who stated that during the
hearings, "the regulations will be reviewed solely to see if they are consistent
' 87 This is the same conclusion reached by the court in Huffer, 524 F. Supp. at 535; see
also Grove City, 687 F.2d at 693 ("the Department was well within its authority when it defined
'recipient' to include any institution which receives federal financial assistance 'through another
recipient.' ").
' 99 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
'" Hearings on Sex Discrimination Regulations Before the Subcommittee an Post Secondary Educa-
tion of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 484 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as 1975 Hearings].
' 9° S. Con. Res. 46, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 17,300-01 (1975).
191 North Haven, 456 U.S. at 532 n.22. The Committee on Labor and Public Welfare had
met in an executive session to discuss the resolution and decided not to report it to the full Senate.
Id.
192 See S. 2146, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 23,845 (1975) (Helms amend-
ment to limit coverage of Title IX only to programs directly receiving federal aid. Not passed by
Senate.); H.R. Con. Res. 310, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 19,209 (1975) (Resolu-
tion to disapprove of the regulations in toto. No action taken).
193 See supra note 104.
194 1975 Hearings, supra note 189.
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with the law. ... to see if the regulation writers have read it and understood it
the way the lawmakers intended it to be read and understood."' 95
During the discussions and exchanges there was, naturally, some confu-
sion and dissent over what Congress intended when passing Title IX. Several
congressmen suggested that the proposed regulations were contrary to what
Congress intended.' 96 In general, however, the majority of the congressmen
and congresswomen appear to have believed that the regulations were consist-
ent with congressional intent.
Support for this generalization can be found at many points in the hear-
ings. At one point, Representative Chisholm, after noting the similarity be-
tween the language of Title IX and that of Title VI, wondered aloud whether
or not the two statutes should be similarly interpreted.'" In a follow up ques-
tion, Representative Quie asked whether Mrs. Chisholm believed Congress
had intended athletics to be covered under Title IX, inasmuch as athletic pro-
grams received no federal funds directly. Mrs. Chisholm indicated in response
her belief that the applicable funding would not have to be direct to be
covered.'" Similar sentiments are echoed later on in the hearings. During
Representative Hawkins' questioning of Dr. Fuzak, the then President of the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), and his associates, Mr.
Hawkins challenged the assertions of the witnesses that Congress did not in-
tend athletics to be covered by Title IX. Indeed, Mr. Hawkins went so far as to
state his belief, albeit a mistaken one, that the committee report specifically had
backed the inclusion of indirectly funded programs, including athletics, within
the strictures of Title IX.' 99
' 95 Id. at 1.
196 For instance, Representative Mottl stated: "As you know, the bureaucrats in HEW
are all wet on this proposal. I think a moratorium should be invoked that there can be further
study." Id. at 48.
197 Id. at 50. Representative Chisholm made the following observation:
Now, since the language of title VI and title IX are so similar, don't you think
that the title IX ban against sex discrimination under 901 must be interpreted in
the same way?
I repeat title VI, bars racial discrimination in any program, any kind of educa-
tional program that receives federal aid directly or indirectly.
Id.
1 " Id. at 53.
Mr. Quie. I was wondering if it could not be possibly construed, as the coaches
have suggested, that athletics are not funded in any way by the Federal Government
and therefore are outside the scope of the HEW guidelines. I think you have the
most expertise on this....
Rep. Chisholm. I am trying to see whether or not the money comes from the
Federal Government.... I just want to be sure that this is understood because it in-
dicates an indirect source of funding. It does not have to be a direct thing.
Id. (emphasis added).
199 Id. at 117-18.
Rep. Hawkins. It seems to me the weight of the argument that is being made
relies heavily on the assumption that college athletics, including football, do not re-
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From a careful reading of the available postenactment legislative history,
the vast majority of which cannot be reprinted here, it is apparent that Con-
gress considered indirect funding to be a source of jurisdiction for the enforce-
ment of Title IX. At the very least, Congress certainly was aware of the issue
when the regulations were being considered. Yet Congress took no action to ex-
clude indirectly funded programs from the reach of Title IX and the regula-
tions during the "laying before" period. This Congressional inaction
strengthens the presumption in favor of the statutory interpretation embodied
in the regulations. 20° Senator Bayh, during his testimony on one of the resolu-
tions of disapproval, best summed up what appears to have been the prevailing
sentiment in Congress. He stated that: "This objection to the coverage of pro-
grams which receive indirect benefits from Federal support — such as athletics
— is directly at odds with the congressional intent to provide coverage for ex-
actly such types of clear discrimination." 20 '
Not only does the evidence available from the hearings, and the failure of
Congress to invalidate the regulations during the "laying before" period,
ceive Federal assistance. Is that the thrust of the argument?
Dr. Fuzak. That is correct, direct Federal assistance.
Rep. Hawkins. Direct.
Dr. Fuzak. That is what title IX says.
Rep. Hawkins. What about indirect? Does it receive any indirect Federal assis-
tance?
Dr. Fuzak. Well, we maintain that it does not get any... I think that the lan-
guage of title IX, though, is very clear in that it says "receiving assistance." We
maintain that it does not receive assistance.
Rep. Hawkins. I would agree that is obviously a difficult thing to ascertain, but
let's understand to what extent Federal assistance may be available to those who
may be involved in athletics and specifically football. Would you say that any of
those who participate in football may be receiving work-study, basic opportunity
grants or any other help due to assistance programs, involving any of the student
assistance programs?
Mr. Marshall. Yes, sir; there are students under various Federal programs, work
study, who do participate in athletics, both men and women.
Mr. Brown. I think we are taking a common sense and literal reading of these
words. Because there is no Federal assistance to the athletic programs of our institu-
tions this provision does not apply.
Rep. Hawkins. Well, I am not so sure. In the report, we backed up that particu-
lar position with respect to assistance which may be indirectly received.
Id. See also id. at 65, where Representative Chisholm stated:
One of the things that is very important is that Federal aid to one kind of school
activity can be indirect financial aid to other kinds of school activities.
For instance, the student fees and scholarship programs, the bonds that are put forth to
build school stadiums, to that extent it may not be direct, but it is indirect and it
means, therefore, that your university may be indirectly in receipt of public funds.
Then, if this is the case, it would seem to me that you must follow the guidelines.
Id. (emphasis added).
2°° See North Haven, 456 U.S. at 534-35. "And the relatively insubstantial interest given
the resolutions of disapproval that were introduced seems particularly significant since Congress
has proceeded to amend § 901 when it has disagreed with HEW's interpretation of the statute."
Id. at 534.
201 1975 Hearings, supra note 189, at 175.
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demonstrate a Congressional intent to include indirect funding within the am-
bit of Title IX, but Congress also has taken specific action to ensure that the
Department's interpretation regarding indirect funding as a source of Title IX
coverage remains in effect. Subsequent to the effective date of the regulations,
Senator McClure proposed two amendments to Title IX designed to define, in
the statute, the terms "education program or activity" 202
 and "Federal finan-
cial assistance."'" The latter amendment would have defined "Federal finan-
cial assistance" as "assistance received by the institution directly from the
federal government. " 204
 In his introductory remarks, Senator McClure stated
that this amendment, number 390, "deals with the regulations issued under
title IX and seeks to restrict some of the overreach of the regulations as they
relate to sex discrimination in colleges. The statute does not require the
breadth or the reach of the regulations. " 205 Later in his remarks, the Senator
implied that the majority of Congress believed that the regulations were too ex-
pansive, but the majority was being frustrated in its attempt to disapprove the
regulations.'" This frustration, the Senator asserted, was occurring because
the resolutions of disapproval were routinely referred to committees and sub-
committees for hearings, the members of which favored the existing interpreta-
tion and thus worked to keep the resolutions from being introduced on the
floor. 207 The Senator apparently misread the will of the majority, however, for
later that same day his amendment was defeated 50-30. 2 "
The debate on the McClure amendment illuminates what Congress in-
tended Title IX to encompass, or at least what Congress believed, in 1976,
Title IX should encompass. During debate, Senator McClure noted that
schools were being deemed subject to Title IX because they were receiving in-
direct assistance, and he stated that his amendment would mandate that a
school receive direct funding before it could be subjected to the statute's pro-
scriptions. 209 This statement brought an immediate response from Senator
202 Amend, 389, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CoNG. REC. 28,136 (1976) ("education pro-
grams or activity means such programs or activities as are curriculum or graduation require-
ments. t)
209
	 390, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CoNG. REC. 28,144 (1976).
204
2°5 Id.
206 Id,
207 Id, The Senator stated:
Those of us who would have them put back into the context of the original con-
gressional enactment are faced with the frustration of a committee that desires to
overreach, but is not expressive of the will of the majority of Congress. That is ab-
solutely the case in this particular matter, because there is no question that Congress
did not intend the length and breadth of the regulations under title IX.
Id.
208 Id. at 28,148.
209 Id. at 28,145. During debate, Senator McClure noted that colleges "are being sub-
jected to Federal control because some student may have Federal assistance. My amendment
would simply say that it has to be direct Federal assistance before they are subjected to the HEW
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Pell, who stated that "the enactment of this amendment would mean that no
funds under the basic grant program [BEOG] would be covered by Title
IX." 2 " Senator Pell argued that these funds should not be allowed to support
discrimination, as this would frustrate the statute's broad policy of preventing
any federal funds from being used to support sex discrimination. 2 " Similar
sentiments were later expressed by Senator Bayh during further discussion on
the amendment. The correct interpretation, according to Senator Bayh, was
that the construction as advanced in the regulations was consistent with con-
gressional intent. He summarized his beliefs by noting: "If a student is bene-
fited, the school is benefited. It is not new law: it is traditional, ',212
regulations at all." Id. The Senator was referring to the case of Hillsdale College which, though
the college had steadfastly refused all direct federal aid during its existence, had been adjudged
subject to Title IX because some of its students had received federal loans and grants, See In the
Matter of Hillsdale College and State of Michigan, Docket No. A-7 (HEW administrative pro-
ceeding, Aug. 23, 1978), reu'd sub corn. Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418 (6th Cir, 1982).
" 122 CONG. REC. at 28,145.
2 " Id. Senator Pell stated: "While these dollars are paid to students they flow through
and ultimately go to institutions of higher education, and I do not believe we should take the posi-
tion that these Federal funds can be used for further discrimination based on sex." Id.
212
 Id, at 28,145-46. It should be noted, however, that Senator Bayh was not always as
certain that student aid constituted a basis for Title IX jurisdiction. During the 1975 Hearings he
was questioned on the issue. After he had apparently asserted that student aid did constitute a
basis for Title IX jurisdiction Representative Quie sought clarification,
Rep. Quie. Are you then saying that the mere fact that an institution accepts
students who receive Federal assistance does not bring them under title IX.
Sen. Bayh. My distinguished colleague is usually very astute. Maybe I am having
difficulty understanding just what he is directing his attention at. I don't think we
have ever had an effort to cut off, say, scholarship students under the GI bill. You
can take that scholarship and go anyplace you want to. That hasn't ever been used
as leverage.
Rep. Quie. I am talking about whether the Department „ . has overstepped its
bounds in claiming that an institution is conducting a program or activity financed
by the Federal Government if a student is receiving Federal aid to attend that pro-
gram or those programs.
Sen. Bayh. You know, I just don't know. I would have to look that up if you
would like; perhaps you know. That is not generally the kind of penalties that are
meted out, as I am sure you realize.
Rep. Quie. But I have heard it claimed that that is one of the reasons why they
have jurisdiction.
Sen. Bayh. I have not.
Id.
This discussion is ambiguous. Senator Bayh appears to have been considering the deci-
sion in the then recent case, Bob Jones Univ, v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974),
where the court, because of the University's racially discriminatory practices, allowed the
Department to terminate Veterans' Administration loans to students who were attending Bob
Jones University. Id. at 608. The court ruled that the loans were not being terminated to the
students per se, because the students remained eligible to receive the loans if they decided to at-
tend another university. Id. at 602. The students merely could not use the money to attend a
discriminating institution. Id.
The exchange between Senator Bayh and Representative Quie, taken in this context,
can be read to imply that Senator Bayh did not believe that funds could be cut off to students, but
could be deferred until such time as they were to attend a qualifying institution. It does not
necessarily imply that the Senator doubted that the funds could be a basis for Title IX jurisdic-
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One additional bit of postenactment history sheds light on what Congress
assumed Title IX encompassed. In 1977 Senators Helms and McClure intro-
duced a bill which would have specifically excluded student aid as a basis for
Title IX jurisdiction. 213 The bill provided that any money which an institution
received on behalf of or from students "shall not be construed as Federal finan-
cial assistance for any purpose under any Act of Congress or any executive
Order.... "2" No action was taken on the bill, however.
Combining all of the available material, the weight of the evidence in the
postenactment history suggests one interpretation: Congress did intend that in-
direct funding, including student aid, bring a program under the aegis of Title
IX. Not only was indirect funding assumed to be a sufficient basis for jurisdic-
tion, but it also was considered specifically and kept as a basis for
jurisdiction. 215 Thus, when the Department issued the regulations, it correctly
interpreted Congressional intent regarding indirect funding.
B. Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics
As noted previously, the sections of the regulations covering inter-
collegiate athletics were the most controversial and provoked the most debate
and concern both within and without Congress. 216 Not only were the proposed
regulations subject to much public debate, but a plethora of bills and resolu-
tions was introduced concerning the athletics section of the final regulations.
Consequently, there is a wealth of postenactment history that specifically ad-
dresses the question of whether Congress intended athletics to be covered by
Title IX.
The first bill concerning the athletics regulations was introduced even
before the proposed regulations were published. On May 20, 1974, almost a
month before the proposed regulations were first publishdd, Senator Tower in-
troduced an amendment to Title IX which would have excluded individual in-
tercollegiate sports from its scope to the extent that a sport provided the institu-
tion with gross receipts or donations necessary to support that sport. 217 This ex-
emption would have eliminated the revenue generated by the major revenue-
producing sports, mainly football and men's basketball, from the regulations'
strictures requiring proportional spending among the sexes for athletics. In a
speech in support of his amendment, the Senator pointed out his belief that
Congress had not intended Title IX to extend to intercollegiate athletics when
tion. " 'When I use a word,' Humptey Dumptey said, in a rather scornful tone, 'it means just
what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.' " L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING
GLASS, ch. 6 (1872).
"3
 S. 1361, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 11,890 (1977).
214 Id. at 11,897.
See supra notes 202-12 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
217 C	 1'441 (id Conv.. 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 15,322 (1974).
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it had adopted the statute.'" After the Senator accepted an amendment offered
by Senator Mondale directing the Commissioner of Education to publish pro-
posed regulations for all of Title IX within 30 days, Senator Tower's amend-
ment was adopted on a voice vote. 219 During the House-Senate conference,
however, Senator Tower's amendment was modified to read that the Secretary
of HEW shall publish, within 30 days, Title IX regulations, "which shall in-
clude with respect to intercollegiate athletics reasonable provisions considering
the nature of particular sports. ,,220
The Department has maintained that the amendment, as adopted, pro-
vides clear support for its position that Title IX was intended to cover athlet-
ics."' Various commentators have also attempted to attach significance to
either the passage of the amendment or to the change introduced in conference.
For instance, one commentator has suggested that the genesis of the amend-
ment does not support the implication that Congress intended Title IX to cover
athletics.'" Another commentator has suggested that the amendment gave the
Department explicit statutory authority to regulate intercollegiate athletics."'
Because of the ambiguity surrounding both the language and the history of this
section, however, neither offers any aid in attempting to discern congressional
intent regarding athletics.
The record of activities after the proposed regulations were issued is more
helpful, however. Before the Department could send the final proposed regula-
tions to Congress for the "laying before" period, they had to be approved by
the president."' In his letter of transmittal to Congress, President Ford ap-
proved the regulations in tato, despite being urged not to do so."' More impor-
2" Id. at 15,323. The senator stated that: "according to my recollection and detailed,
recent investigation, I do not believe that Congress intended title IX to extend to intercollegiate
athletics „ " Id.
21s
220
 Education Amendments of 1974 § 844, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
221
 In discussing the authority of HEW to promulgate regulations for Title IX, then
HEW Secretary Weinberger noted:
An Amendment to the Education Amendments of 1974 was introduced by Sen.
John Tower on the floor of the Senate specifically exempting from Title IX revenue
from revenue-producing intercollegiate athletics. The "Tower Amendment" was
deleted by the conference committee and was, in effect, replaced by the so-called
"Javits Amendment." The Javits language, which was enacted, requires that
H.E.W.'s Title IX regulation contain reasonable provisions on intercollegiate
athletics taking into account "the nature of the particular sport."
Any legal doubt that athletics are covered has thus been resolved."
Note, Sex Discrimination and Intercollegiate Athletics, 61 IOWA L. REV. 420, 468 n.269 (quoting The
Chronicle of Higher Educ., April 7, 1975 at 11-12).
222 Kuhn, supra note 6, at 75.
223 Note, supra note 8, at 579-81.
22+
 Education Amendments of 1972 § 902, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976). Section 902 pro-
vides: "no such rule, regulation, or order shall become effective unless and until approved by the
President." Id.
225
	 Frohnmayer, Title IX: Education Amendments of 1972, 2 J. COLL. & U. L. 49, 59
(1973).
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tantly, he specifically noted in the letter that the Department of Justice had ad-
vised him that the athletics sections were indeed consistent with Congressional
intent regarding athletics. 226
The President's approval of the athletics sections of the regulations was
later echoed in hearings on a resolution which was introduced to disapprove of
the regulations only to the extent that they mandated coverage of
employment. 227
 In his statement before the subcommittee conducting the hear-
ings, Representative O'Hara, the sponsor of the resolution, stated that it was
the opinion of the committee members who had been charged with examining
the proposed regulations, that the athletics sections were entirely consistent
with Congressional intent. He noted that this conclusion was reached despite
the belief by several members of the committee, including himself, that Con-
gress' decision to cover athletics was unwise as a policy matter.'"
Most of the discussion during the 1975 hearings on the regulations and
their consistency with congressional intent concerned the coverage of athlet-
ics.'" The members of the subcommittee conducting the hearings were aware
of the concerns of the various lobbyists and witnesses that the language of the
statute was susceptible to several interpretations regarding the inclusion of
athletics. Representative Buchannan at one point stated: "We may have a
special problem in terms of athletics. If so, it is my profound hope that the com-
mittee won't take the position which would interpret away title IX, but that we
226 Letter from President Ford to Congress (July 21, 1975), reprinted in S. 2106 to Amend
Title IX: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Education of the Committee of Labor and Public Welfare, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 188-89 (1975). The letter stated:
As you know, the Department spent almost three years in developing this Regula-
tion. I personally reviewed it with Secretary Weinberger and received advice from
the Department of Justice before approving it, as required.
The effect of the Regulation on intercollegiate and other athletic activities has
drawn more public comment than any other aspect. Many believe that the Regula-
tion should not apply to intercollegiate athletics. I am advised, however, that this would
not be consistent with the law Congress passed.
Id. (emphasis added).
227
	 Con. Res. 330: Hearings Before the House Subcommittee on Post Secondary Education of the
Committee of Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
228
 Id. at 9. Representative O'Hara stated:
Mr. Chairman, let me get back to the key issues involved.... There are, Mr.
Chairman, two charges which have been directed at the resolution of disapproval
which I believe must be exposed here and now, not as honest differences of ap-
proval, but as downright misstatements.
The resolution of disapproval, Mr. Chairman, has no relevance to the so-called
athletic issue. We looked at the athletic regulation along with the rest of the set of
regulations, and whatever our individual conclusions about its wisdom or its import-
ance, there was no finding of inconsistency with regard to that regulation.
I have reservations about the wisdom of those regulations, and I have introduced
legislation to clarify the law in this respect. But that is a very different thing from
disapproving the regulations.
Id. (emphasis added).
229 See generally 1975 Hearings, supra note 189.
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may make some specific legislative changes." 23 ° Yet the members of the com-
mittee saw no need to propose changes to Title IX to clarify the language of the
statute. Rather, from the members' statements, it is apparent that they as-
sumed that athletics were covered under the statute as written."' Indeed, al-
though during the hearings the NCAA and various University administrators,
coaches, and professors urged the committee members to issue a statement of
disapproval, the members refused to do so.
After it became apparent that the House was not going to disapprove the
athletics sections of the regulations, several members of the Senate introduced
resolutions to induce the Senate to voice its disapproval of the athletics sections.
The Senate resolutions, however, fared no better than their counterparts in the
House. Senator Laxalt introduced one such resolution."' In his introduction,
he asserted that the regulations regarding athletics "greatly exceed the intent of
Congress and are inconsistent with the expressed language of title IX." 233
Senator Laxalt noted that the language mandated that only programs receiving
federal financial assistance were covered under the statute. 234 He further noted
that there was not a college athletic department anywhere in the country that
directly received federal funding, and then stated his belief that: "The inter-
collegiate athletics provisions of the regulations are thus inconsistent with the
statute in that they impose requirements on college programs not receiving
Federal assistance. "23s The Senator also specifically noted that the Department
was interpreting the statute to include student loans and grants within the term
"federal financial assistance," and intended to subject a university's athletic
program to Title IX's guidelines on the basis of its students having accepted
these federal funds. 236 He concluded that the Department had "both exceeded
the scope of its authority and contravened the intent of Congress expressed in
the provisions of title IX," and urged disapproval of the two athletics sections
of the regulations. 237 Senator Laxalt's resolution was not acted upon. 238
23° Id. at 95.
2 " See id. at 186 (remarks of Rep. Blouin) ("I think ... that the legislation's intent is
clear, to balance off the institutional educational opportunities of athletics.); id. at 177-78
(remarks of Rep. Brademas) ("it is well-settled that statutes such as the one under consideration
require a clean bill of health for the entire educational institution, not just the part of the institu-
tion that is directly receiving assistance [and] athletics would be included, would be covered
by the regulations under consideration."); id. at 182-83 (remarks of Rep. Chisholm) ("Although
the furor has been centered around intercollegiate sports activity, I think title IX embraces much
more than just sports."); id. at 184 (remarks of Rep. Simon) ("I agree with your conclusion that
HEW acted properly; this is within its scope."); it at 184-85 (remarks of Rep. Buchannan).
232
 S. Con. Res. 52, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 22,940 (1975).
233 Id.
234. Id. at 22,940-41.
233
	 at 22,941.
23e
237 Id.
23° North Haven, 456 U .S. at 532 & n.22.
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On the same day that Senator Laxalt introduced his resolution, he and
Senators Tower, Bartlett, and Hruska introduced a bill, S. 2106, to amend
Title IX. 239 The bill was very similar in design to the amendment which
Senator Tower had previously introduced,'" and would have exempted from
Title IX's coverage the revenues produced by specific sports to the extent that
the funds produced did not exceed the amount budgeted by the school for that
sport. 24 ' After the regulations had already become effective, two days of hear-
ings were held on the bill. 242 During the hearings, Senator Hruska, though
noting his personal doubt about the intent of Congress with respect to coverage
of athletics, stated that the bill did not challenge the application of Title IX to
athletics generally, as the majority of Congress had already acquiesced in the
Department's interpretation. 243
 "Should S. 2106 become law, Title IX would
continue to apply to all other aspects of intercollegiate athletics ... I cannot
emphasize too strongly the limited scope of this bill. >244
Others echoed the belief that Title IX mandated coverage of athletics. The
ever present Senator Bayh argued against reporting the bill to the full commit-
tee, stating: "The question before this subcommittee today is whether the Con-
gress should retreat from the full commitment it has given to provide equal
educational opportunity for women in athletics. "245 A representative of HEW
noted that "it is clear that the statute covered athletic programs offered by
educational institutions, „246 while Senator Pell stated his opinion that Con-
gress had already decided the issue when it declined to pass any of the resolu-
tions of disapproval which had been placed before it. 247 The bill was never
reported out of the subcommittee.
It is apparent from the bills which were introduced and the discussions on
those bills that Congress was fully aware of both the Department's interpreta-
tion of Congressional intent as embodied in the regulations, and of the conse-
quences of allowing that interpretation to stand. Congress was given several
opportunities to either disapprove the regulations or amend the statute, yet
declined to do so. It did, however, amend the statute several times to exclude
other programs which, if they received any funding at all, received only in-
219 S. 2106, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 22,777 (1975).
"° See supra text accompanying notes 217-23.
24 ' 121 CONG. REC. 22,777.
242 See S. 2106 Hearings, supra note 226.
"I Id. at 7. " As [Senator Tower] emphasized, S. 2106 does not challenge the applica-
tion of Title IX to intercollegiate athletics, although I have serious doubts about the intent of
Congress in that regard.” Id.
244
 Id, at 7-8.
2" Id. at 46.
246
	 at 170 (remarks of Assistant Secretary Kurtzman).
24 Id. at 1. "I think it is important to state here that title IX was enacted in 1972, and it
is the law. Regulations were issued, regulations which the Congress could have disapproved of,
yet did not." Id.
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direct federal funding.'" Consequently, the conclusion is inescapable that
Congress did intend Title IX to reach intercollegiate athletics and that the
Department correctly interpreted the intent of Congress when it promulgated
the regulations.
V. AFTERMATH AND IMPLICATIONS
The authority given the Department of Education by Title IX must be in-
terpreted broadly if the statute is to be administered as Congress intended it to
be. The statute was enacted to prevent federal funds from being used to sup-
port sex based discrimination in education. Congress intended funds indirectly
received by educational institutions, including money which was initially
received by students from the government, to fall within the prohibition. There
are several reasons for reaching this conclusion. Congress was appraised fully
of both the Department's interpretation regarding the use of indirect funds as a
basis for jurisdiction, and of the inclusion of athletic programs under that
jurisdictional basis. Congress also was fully aware of the extent of the opposi-
tion to the Department's interpretation. Yet Congress took no steps to exclude
athletics from Title IX coverage. Quite the contrary, it defeated several resolu-
tions and bills which would have specifically excluded athletics, or at least por-
tions thereof, from Title IX's coverage. Yet, Congress was not hesitant to
amend the statute when it did decide that the Department's regulations had in
fact gone beyond the scope of the authorization. Consequently, the regulations
regarding indirectly funded programs in general, and athletic programs
specifically, are within the scope of the statutory grant of authority.
Returning to the two major cases considered in this note, it is apparent
that the Haffer decision is the one most consonant with both congressional in-
tent and the approach established by the Supreme Court in North Haven for dis-
cerning that intent. The Haffer court correctly determined that the primary
question for decision was whether the athletic program was a "program or ac-
tivity receiving Federal financial assistance" for purposes of Title IX. Al-
though the Haffer district court reached its decision before North Haven had been
decided, the Haffer court anticipated the approach of the Supreme Court deci-
sion. Finding the statutory language ambiguous, the Haffer court conducted a
review of both the pre- and postenactment legislative history and concluded
that it was obvious that "Congress approved of the broad scope of Title IX,
and specifically its application to intercollegiate athletic programs. ; 7249
In contrast, although the Richmond court had the North Haven decision be-
fore it, it failed to analyze the statute using the North Haven approach. The Rich-
mond court noted that it made its determination following "careful considera-
tion of the briefs, -stipulated facts, and relevant authority. " 250 Although the
246 See supra note 98.
249 Haffer, 524 F. Supp. at 534.
25° Richmond, 543 F. Supp. at 327.
1280	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 24:1243
briefs presumably made some mention of the legislative and postenactment
histories, the court failed to address either in its opinion. Instead, the court
merely determined that Congress intended only specific "educational pro-
grams" to be covered, without offering any justification for its determination.
Furthermore, the court never defined exactly what constituted an "educational
program" for purposes of Title IX. Rather, the court focused on the nature of
the funding, ruling that Congress intended only directly funded "programs,"
whatever they might be, to fall within the ambit of Title IX."' This emphasis
on direct funding as the sole Title IX jurisdictional basis is not a correct inter-
pretation of Congressional intent, as expressed in hearings and debates on the
issue. Accordingly, it is apparent that the Haffer decision is the one consistent
with Congressional intent and is the one which should be followed in future
Title IX cases."'
There are still several questions which remain unanswered, however. One
question is: What amount of aid should be required to subject a school to the
mandates of Title IX? Should more than a de minimus amount be necessary? or
should any amount, no matter how small, suffice to require Title IX compli-
ance? It is unlikely, however, that this question will come up in a university
context, for it is doubtful that many higher education institutions would be able
to have many students forego their BEOG's, GSL's and NDSL's and still have
them be able to attend school. Because of the pervasiveness of these federal
grant and loan programs, which qualify as indirect aid to a school under the
regulations, most colleges and universities will continue to be held to compli-
ance with Title IX. It is submitted, however, that if force is to be given to the
statute's broad policy objective, preventing any federal money from being used
to support discrimination, a school's receipt of any amount of federal aid, de
minimus or not, should suffice to bring it within the ambit of the statute.
A more troublesome question is what result should ensue if a university
builds a financial "chinese wall" around its athletic department, or a small
portion of the department, so that the athletic department is not funded out of
the same pool of resources that the student loans and grants have gone into? It
is conceivable, albeit unlikely, that a university could establish a separate de-
"' Id. at 333.
"' In general, the Hoffer decision comports with the restrictions and guidelines estab-
lished in North Haven. The Richmond court dismissed in a sentence the district court's opinion in
Haffer, 543 F. Supp. at 328, and focused almost exclusively on the program-specific limitation of
section 901 and North Haven, ruling that the Department had contravened that limitation in pro-
mulgating the regulations. Id, at 327. Because the Supreme Court declined to define "program
or activity" for purposes of Title IX, however, the program-specific limitation is a paper tiger.
All that is necessary to comply with the limitation is to define "program" as encompassing the
whole institution when indirectly received general funds are alleged as the source of departmental
jurisdiction. See Grove City, 687 F.2d at 698-99; Hoffer, 524 F. Supp. at 541. To the extent,
however, that the district court in Hoffer suggests that the Department's regulatory authority is
broader than its termination authority, 524 F. Supp. at 533-34, its opinion has been superseded
by the Supreme Court's ruling to the contrary in North Haven. See 456 U.S. at 535-36.
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partment that would house only the major revenue-producing sports and have
that department be funded solely from event fees and alumni donations.
Moreover, the university could fully cover the tuition and living expenses of its
athletes from this separate department's funds and thus obviate need for its
student-athletes to accept federal financial aid. Without any nexus between this
separate department and general federal funds provided to the university, the
Department would be hard pressed to meet the program-specific limitation
established by the Supreme Court in North Haven.
Although the likelihood that such a situation will occur is remote, in the
event that it does, the Department should be allowed to interpret its mandate
as allowing it to cover such a situation. As has been seen, Congress was unable
to anticipate that the coverage of athletics would be challenged, much less that
a wall around an athletic department might be created. Thus, it is obvious that
Congress will not have prescribed the correct treatment of all possible struc-
tural permutations which a university could conceive. Given the broad scope of
the statute, however, the Department should be granted sufficient leeway
under the statute to reach unusual situations. Form should not be allowed to
triumph over substance. In the event a university does create such a wall, it is
submitted that the Department should be allowed to treat it as a sham, and re-
quire Title IX compliance despite the existence of the wall. This result would
be preferable to allowing a university to escape compliance with the statute
through structural maneuvers.
Finally, assuming the Department will be able to reach a university
through the financial aid which its students receive, what should be the penalty
meted out should the university not remedy its sex discrimination problems?
Section 902 authorizes the Department to either terminate or refuse to continue
funding in the event of a failure of a recipient to comply with the regulations. 253
It is submitted that the latter alternative should be exercised when students'
funds are involved. Although the termination of funding to a university's cur-
rent recipients could be an effective tool in persuading it to comply with the
regulations, such a result could work tremendous harm upon students who are
not responsible for the discrimination. A better alternative would be a refusal
by the Department to allow prospective students to qualify for aid, with the re-
quirement that the school advertise this restriction prominently in its cata-
logues and recruiting information. The school would be given the same incen-
tive to comply with the regulations, but the severe impact that immediate ter-
mination would have on current students would be eliminated. This procedure
would comport with Congress' desire that fund termination only be used as a
last resort where less drastic measures have failed because of the severe impact
termination has on students. 254
"3 See supra note 3.
"4 See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704-6 nn.38-40; Hillsdale Col-
lege v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418, 437 (6th Cir. 1982)•(Edwards, C.J., dissenting); Hailer, 524 F.
Supp. at 533-34.
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CONCLUSION
Title IX was enacted to prevent any federal funds from being used to sup-
port sex discrimination in education. Following the North Haven approach to
Title IX analysis, this note has determined that Congress intended that indi-
rectly received funds, such as student grants and loans, fall within the statute's
prohibition. This intent is evidenced in both the contemporary legislative
history and the postenactment history of the statute. Because the decision of the
Hoffer court is the one most consonant with that intent, it should be followed in
future Title IX cases involving the athletic regulations.
RICHARD M. GRAF
